Manufactured export performance of Brazil: analysis of determinants and prospects by Nunnenkamp, Peter & Fasano-Filho, Ugo
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nunnenkamp, Peter; Fasano-Filho, Ugo
Working Paper
Manufactured export performance of
Brazil: analysis of determinants and
prospects
Kiel Working Papers, No. 269
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Nunnenkamp, Peter; Fasano-Filho, Ugo (1986) : Manufactured export
performance of Brazil: analysis of determinants and prospects, Kiel Working Papers, No. 269,
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/1076Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 269
Manufactured Export Performance of Brazil:
Analysis of Determinants and Prospects
by
Peter Nunnenkamp and Ugo Fasano-Filho
Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel
ISSN 0342-0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
Department IV
Dusternbrooker Weg 120, D-2300 Kiel
Kiel Working Paper No. 269
Manufactured Export Performance of Brazil:
Analysis of Determinants and Prospects
by
Peter Nunnenkamp and Ugo Fasano-Filho
September 1986
The authors themselves, not the Kiel Institute of World Econ-
omics, are solely responsible for the contents and distribution
of each Kiel Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticisms and sugges-
tions directly to the authors and to clear any quotations with
them.
ISSN 0341 - 0787- I -
Table of Contents
LIST OF TABLES III
LIST OF ANNEX TABLES IV
LIST OF FIGURES V
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 1
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS: AN OVERVIEW 4
1.1. Export Performance in Different Markets 4
1.2. The Relevance of Demand Factors for Export
Expansion 11
1.3. Determinants of Brazil's Export Performance:
Some Hypotheses 13
CHAPTER 2
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, ECONOMIC POLICIES AND EXPORT
PERFORMANCE 17
2.1. Brazil's Revealed Comparative Advantages
. - in Different Markets 17
2.2. Factor Use and Export Performance of
Brazilian Industries 22
2.3. Economic Policies towards Exports and Brazil's
Export Performance 30
2.3.1. Relevance of Economic Policies:
Introductory Remarks 30
2.3.2. Possible Determinants of Manufactured
Export Growth 32
2.3.3. Government Incentives to Exports and
Import Protection: The Net Effects 36
2.3.4. Anti-Export Bias and Export Performance 4 4- II -
CHAPTER 3
EXPORT PERFORMANCE AT THE FIRM LEVEL: MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS
OF EXPORTING FIRMS AS POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS 50
3.1. The Relevance of Firm-Specific Analysis 50
3.2. Policy Discrimination against Small Exporters 52
3.3. A Comparison of Exporting and Non-Exporting
Firms in the Manufacturing Industry of Brazil 53
3.4. Major Determinants of Export Performance at the
Firm Level: A Summary of Previous Research and
Open Questions 61
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 69
ANNEX I: Export Expansion and Economic Growth:
The Brazilian Case, 1969-1984 75
ANNEX II: Real Exchange Rates and Export Growth in Brazil 78
ANNEX TABLES 84
REFERENCES 111- III -
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1 - Growth of Manufactured Exports of Brazil and
Other Regions, 1963-84 6
Table 1.2 - Coitunodity Composition of Brazilian Manu-
factured Exports to Developed Countries
and ALADI, 1962-81 9
Table 1.3 - Constant Market Share Analysis of Brazilian
Manufactured Exports to Different Markets in
Different Subperiods, 1962-81 12
Table 2.1 - Export Performance Ratios for Brazilian
Manufactured Exports to Different Markets,
1962-81 18
Table 2.2 - Factor Intensities in Brazilian Manufacturing
Industries, 1980 25
Table 2.3 - Spearman and Pearson Coefficients for Corre-
lations between Factor Intensities in Brazi-
lian Industries and Brazil's Export Pattern 28
Table 2.4 - Regression Results on Major Determinants of
Brazilian Exports to Various Markets,
1968-81 34
Table 2.5 - Incentives to Exports and Domestic Sales
in Brazil, 1980 40
Table 2.6 - The Relationship between Policy Incentives
and Factor Intensities in Brazilian Indus-
tries, 1980 45
Table 2.7 - The Relationship between Policy Incentives
and Export Performance of Brazilian Indus-
tries: Rank Correlation Results 48
Table 3.1 - Spearman Coefficients for Rank Correlations
between Export Volume and Rate of Fiscal
Export Subsidy, 1978 54
Table 3.2 - Percentage of Exporting Firms by Size and
Industries, 1978 56
Table 3.3 - Spearman Coefficients for Rank Correlations
between Firm Size and Export Performance,
1978 57
Table 3.4 - Capital Intensity of Exporting and Non-
Exporting Brazilian Firms by Industry, 1978 60- IV -
Table 3.5 - Comparison of Exporting and Non-Exporting
Brazilian Firms as regards Electricity Con-
sumption and Wages Paid: Selected Industries
by Firm Size, 1974
LIST OF ANNEX TABLES
Table A.I.l - Export Expansion and Economic Growth:
Regression Results for Brazil
Table A.II.l - Brazil: Different Measures of the Real
Exchange Rate, 1963-84
Table A.II.2 - Brazil: Profitability of Exports vis-ä-
vis the Domestic Market, 1962-84
Table AI - Brazil's Nominal Export Growth in
Different SITC-Categories, 1963-81
Table A2 - Classification of Brazilian Industries
According to Capital Investment per
Employee, 1960-79
Table A3 - Manufactured Export Structure of Different
Regions and Brazil, 1965-81
Table A4 - Regional Distribution of Brazilian Manu-
factured Exports at 1-Digit SITC-Level,
1962-81
Table A5 - Gini Coefficients of Brazilian Manufactured
Export Concentration in Different Export
Markets, 1962-81
Table A6 - Structure of Brazilian Manufactured Exports
at 2-Digit SITC-Level, 1962-81
Table A7 - Brazil: Revealed Comparative Advantage,
1962-81
Table A8, - Brazil: A Comparison of Different Indices of
Revealed Comparative Advantage for Manufac-
turing Industries at 4-Digit SITC-Level,
1964-80
Table A9 - Brazil: A Comparison of the Traditional Con-
cept of Revealed Comparative Advantage and
Bowen's Index for Manufacturing Industries
and Various Markets, 1964-80
Table A10 - Value Added per Employee in Industries in















Table All - Wages per Employee in Industries in Brazil
and Various Country Groups, 1980 101
Table AI2 - Non-Wage Value Added per Employee in Indus-
tries in Brazil and Various Country Groups,
1980 102
Table A13 - Spearman and Pearson Coefficients for Cor-
relations between Factor Intensities in
Brazilian Industries and Brazil's Export
Pattern, without Machinery and Transport
Equipment 103
Table A14 - Evolution of Revealed Comparative (Dis)-
Advantage of Brazilian Manufactured Ex-
ports Classified by Export Market at
2-Digit SITC-Level, 1962-81 104
Table A15 - Average Rates of Nominal Tariff Protection
in Brazil, 1966-80 105
Table A16 - The Relationship between Policy Incentives
and Factor Intensities in Brazilian
Industries: Rank Correlation Results,
1980 106
Table A17 - The Openness of Different Brazilian Indus-
tries, 1963-80 107
Table A18 - Relative Importance of Different Types of
Firms in Industrial Sectors of Brazil,
1972 108
Table A19 - Participation of Foreign-Owned Firms in
Total Employment, Value Added, Domestic
Sales, Exports and Export Subsidies in
Brazil, 1978 109
Table A20 - Logit Analysis of the Probability of
Exporting in Brazilian Industries 110
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure A.II.l - Indices of Real Exchange Rates,
Profitability of Exports and Brazilian
Manufactured Exports to the World,
US and ALADI, 1963-81 83INTRODUCTION*
Compared to other developing countries, the economic record of
Brazil is characterized by outstanding rates of manufactured
export expansion and the accumulation of a staggering foreign
debt bürden. In the 1980s, debt Service obligations became unten-
able, and misguided interventionistic government policies rein-
forced rather than mitigated an economic crisis reflected in
declining per capita incomes and rapidly increasing rates of
inflation. In the short term, the economic welfare of Brazil will
substantially depend on improvements in the economic management
of the country; a task which the government has acknowledged by
introducing the 'Plan Cruzado
1 (for an evaluation, see Fischer,
1986). In the medium and long term, future economic development
of Brazil hinges on the country's ability to tackle the debt
problem by generating more financial resources internally. One
Option towards this end is to sustain high rates of export growth
and, if possible, to exploit the export potential of the country
even more rigorously than in the past.
In assessing the future export potential of the Brazilian econ-
omy, in particular with respect to manufactured exports, a neces-
sary first step is an evaluation of the past and present export
Performance compared to the likely export potential of the coun-
try in the respective time periods. This is the focus of the
present study. An attempt is made to analyse the sources of in-
ternational competitiveness of Brazilian manufacturing indus-
tries, the incentive System established by the government, and
the actual export Performance since the early 1960s. The latter
is outlined in the first chapter which provides an analysis of
internal and external determinants of export success or failure.
* The authors owe thanks to Bernhard Fischer and Ulrich Hiemenz
for their constructive criticism of earlier drafts of this
study, for many helpful suggestions and for their co-operation
in preparing this Version of the study.- 2 -
Since export conditions differ considerably between the Latin
American market and markets in other regions due to preferential
trading arrangements in the former (LAFTA, since 1980:ALADI) ,
major emphasis is placed on the direction of Brazilian exports
and a differentiation of determinants for export expansion in
Latin American and other- markets. This overview provides the
basis for evaluating the interrelations between comparative ad-
vantage, international competitiveness, economic policy, and ex-
port Performance in the second chapter. Again, differences be-
tween major export markets figure prominently in the analysis,
which seeks to explain the export pattern of Brazil in the past,
both in terms of commodity composition and direction of trade,
based on measures of revealed comparative advantage and an analy-
sis of factor intensities prevailing in Brazilian industries.
Chapter 2 provides clues as to whether the international competi-
tiveness of Brazilian manufactured exports was due to comparative
advantage in production or to artificial competitive advantages,
and hence, on whether government incentives were in line or rath-
er in conflict with comparative advantages. These results also
shed some light on activities with a promising export potential
in the future.
Any analysis of determinants of export Performance, that is based
on aggregate sectoral data is bound to overlook important fea-
tures of international competitiveness as they are created and
emerge at the micro level. Therefore, the sectoral analysis is
supplemented by a closer look at some major differences between
exporting and non-exporting firms within individual industries in
Chapter 3. This is to clarify the relationship between ownership,
firm size, factor endowment and discriminatory economic policies
on the one hand and export Performance on the other. In partic-
ular, a micro approach allows to assess the role of multinational
The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) consisted of
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela; the jnembership did not
change with_ the transition to the Associacao Latino-Americana
de Integracao (ALADI).- 3 -
companies in the Brazilian export success which may hold some
lessons for other developing countries and their attitude towards
foreign investors. The micro view presented in this study largely
draws on an ECLA survey and thus only touches the tip of the
iceberg. Hence, coriclusions drawn in the final chapter are of a
preliminary nature until möre detailed sector studies provide
firmer ground for policy recommendations.- 4 -
CHAPTER 1
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS; AN OVERVIEW
1.1. Export Performance in Different Markets
Brazilian manufactured exports have grown rapidly and in a stable
fashion since the early 1960s . While these exports amounted to
only ÜS$ 36 million in 1963, they reached over US$ 10 billion in
1984. In real terms, the average annual growth rate of Brazilian
manufactured exports was 22 percent in 1963-84. Over the same
period, world exports in manufactured goods grew at an average
annual rate of about 7 percent, and manufactured exports of South
and South-East Asian countries at about 15 percent (for more de-
2
tailed information, see Table 1.1) . The manufactured export
Manufactured exports are reported in the Standard International
Trade Classification (SITC) and include the following SITC-cat-
egories: 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures, excluding cat-
egories 67 and 68), 7 (mechanical and transport equipment), and
8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods). We refer to UN, Commodity
Trade Statistics as the principal source for Brazilian export
Performance because other sources do not provide a sufficiently
disaggregated picture of Brazil's exports, both in terms of
commodity composition and direction of trade. A disaggregated
analysis is required since export conditions can be supposed to
differ considerably between different commodity groups and dif-
ferent markets. The analysis has to be largely concentrated on
the period 1963-81 since, for subsequent years, similarly dis-
aggregated information on Brazilian manufactured exports is not
available from Commodity Trade Statistics. Thus, only some more
general indications of Brazil's export Performance can be pre-
sented>for the most recent past. Several studies have been done
on Brazilian manufactured exports; see among others, Doellinger
and Dumas (1971), Tyler (1976; 1983), Rosa (1978), and Pinto
(1980). Most of these studies cover the 1960s and early 1970s,
a World Bank report (1983) Covers the 1970s and Cardoso (1982)
presents an analysis of Brazil's foreign trade over the last
Century.
2
The calculation of real export growth is sensitive to the price
index chosen to deflate nominal exports. Using the US wholesale
price index as deflator, Dippl (1986, Table 1) computes real
growth rates of 34.6 percent for 1965-73 and 13 percent for
1973-82. In comparing Brazilian export growth rates with other
countries or country groups, additional distortions arise due
to differences in the deflators that had to be applied (see
footnote to Table 1.1). For example, real growth in manufac-
continued on p. 5- 5 -
Performance of Brazil was not only impressive in the period of
favourable world trade conditions (1963-73) but also for the
subsequent years of depressed world demand. Notwithstanding the
decline in Brazilian export growth after 1973, the country still
outperformed the world and even the very successful East and
South-East Asian exporters.
The remarkable export Performance of Brazil has been accompanied
by significant changes in the product composition of manufactured
exports as well as in the direction of trade. After 1973, growth
of world market sales was most impressive for such non-tradition-
al export items as plastics (44 percent per annum in nominal
terms) , transport equipment (40 percent), non-electrical machin-
ery (30 percent), and paper and paperboard (30 percent; see Table
AI in the statistical annex). On the other hand, more traditional
export products in the basic manufactures category (e.g. leather,
textiles, non-metallic mineral manufactures) as well as footwear
and electrical machinery, which headed export growth in 1963-73,
feil considerably behind thereafter. As a result, the structure
of Brazil's manufactured exports became similar to the pattern of
world exports, while in 1973 it was very close to the export
structure of the group of developing countries (Table A3) . The
evidence indicates that the composition of Brazil's manufactured
exports has moved away from that of other successful exporting
nations in the Third World, as e.g. countries in Asia, and now
resembles more the export bündle of an industrialized country.
This impression is confirmed - at least at first glance - by
factor intensities embodied in different export items. The
emerging top export products are manufactured in relatively cap-
tured exports of other developing countries is understated in
periods of raw material price booms since the index of overall
export unit values had to be used. Notwithstanding such dis-
tortions, Brazil's export Performance relative to other country
groups remains impressive. It seems safe to assume that Brazil
has outperformed world export growth, considering the remark-
able differences in the growth rates shown in Table 1.1.
Real growth rates for individual SITC-categories cannot be
calculated since Information on adequate price deflators is not
available (for details, see Table AI).- 6 -
Table 1.1 - Growth of Manuf actured Exports of Brazil and Other Regions,
1963-84




































































































d 12.3 17.5 10.1 11.7 10.0 15.1 10.6
South and South-East
Asian countfies 12.5 21.2 12.2 13.2 10.3 17.2 12.1
a Manufactured goods correspond to SITC: 5+6-(67+68)+7+8. World exports of
manufactured goods were deflated by export unit values of industrial coun-
tries, Brazilian manufactured exports by an index of manufactured export
prices published by the Getülio Vargas Foundation, developing countries manu-
factured exports by the export unit value of non-oil developing countries, and
South and South-East Asian countries manufactured exports by the export unit
value of Asia. - Only until 1983 for developing countries and South and
South-East Asian countries. -
 c Up to 1981 for, Brazil and world to the US,
ALADI, EEC + EFTA; and the rest of the world. - Excluding Brazilian exports.
Source: Own caleulations based on UN, Comodity Trade Statistics; IMF, Inter-
national Financial Statistics.- 7 -
ital-intensive industries while growth of many labour-intensive
export categories has slowed down considerably .
An important reason for the changing role of different export
items and the rising share of rather capital-intensive goods
after 1973 becomes obvious when looking at changes of the di-
rection of Brazilian manufactured exports. With respect to both
total manufactured exports and exports of the individual SITC-
groups 5-8, developed countries (mainly US and EEC) and ALADI
were by far the most important markets for Brazil accounting for
more than 80 percent of all exports (Table A4) . This holds true
even though the share of developing countries outside the ALADI
region in total Brazilian manufactured exports increased by more
than 10 percentage points from 5 to 16 percent between the early
1960s and the early 1980s. However, the relative importance of
the two major regional markets for Brazilian manufactured exports
varied considerably over time. In 1973, developed countries ac-
counted for nearly two thirds of total manufactured exports,
whereas the share of ALADI had fallen to less than a quarter.
Later on, the share of developed countries dropped to 5 2 percent
(1978) and 44 percent (1981) and ALADI gained significantly in
importance (30 and 39 percent, respectively). These shifts are
also reflected in real growth rates of Brazilian manufactured
exports to different regions (Table 1.1). Comparing 1963-73 and
1974-81, real growth rates were nearly halved for exports to US
and EEC+EFTA, mainly due to demand factors, whereas export growth
2
to ALADI even increased after 1973 .
Ranking Brazilian industries according to capital investment
per employee, all four non-traditional industries except non-
electrical machinery (on average, SITC 71 ranges in the middle)
figure prominently in the top group of relatively capital-
intensive industries (Table A2).
o
Figures on world exports to different regions (also presented
in Table 1.1) point to the dominant role of demand factors in
explaining these remarkable differences. From world exports it
is evident that the growth in total ALADI imports increased
after 1973 whereas Overall exports to developed countries slow-
ed down drastically due to depressed world trade conditions.- 8 -
The increasing share of ALADI markets in Brazilian manufactured
exports after 1973 is most relevant in understanding the changes
in commodity composition, since the bündle of products delivered
to ALADI markets and markets of developed economies was distinct-
ly different (Table 1.2; for further details, see Table A6):
- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, nearly half of Brazilian
manufactured exports to developed countries feil into the basic
manufactures category (SITC 6). In subsequent years, the share
of products belonging to this category dropped to 30 and 23
percent. Brazilian exports to developed countries became more
diversified (as indicated by the Gini coefficient which can be
used as a measure of export concentration; Table A5) and two
new types of exports gained in importance. Firstly, labour-in-
tensive products of SITC 8 jumped from practically nil in 1968
to more than 20 percent in the early 1980s, due to exports of
footwear in the first place. As a result, rather labour-inten-
sive products of SITC-categories 6 and 8 continued to account
for a significant share in Brazil's exports to developed econo-
mies in the 1970s and early 1980s. Secondly, the shares of
non-electrical machinery and transport equipment increased
remarkably after 1973. It has to be borne in mind, though, that
in 1973 the shares of these items were considerably lower than
in the 1960s. The rapid export expansion in these categories
nevertheless suggests a substantial degree of international
competitiveness.
- Brazil's manufactured exports to ALADI reveal a completely
different pattern. Apart from 1968, basic manufactures merely
accounted for about 20 percent. Miscellaneous products of SITC-
category 8 were even less relevant. Exports to ALADI were dom-
inated by machinery and transport equipment . The share of SITC
7 which amounted to 53-55 percent in the late 1960s and early
1970s further increased to 62-63 percent later on. Looking at
Consequently, the concentration in Brazilian manufactured ex-
ports to ALADI (measured by the Gini coefficient in Table A5)
exceeded the corresponding figures for exports to developed
countries.- 9 -





SITC 1962 1968 1973 1978 1981
Developed
countries
5 Chemicals 56 32 10 8 15
6 Basic manufactures 26 45 46 30 23
65 Textiles (4) (9) (23) (13) (11)
7 Machinery and transport
equipment 16 19 17 39 40
71 Non-electr. mach. (1) (13) (7) (19) (19)
72 Electr. mach. (-) (1) (8) (12) (7)
73 Transport equipment (14) (5) (2) (8) (14)
8 Misc. manufactures 2 4 27 23 21
84 Clothing (-) (1) (8) (4) (2)
85 Fcotwear (-) (-) (13) (14) (15)
ALADI 5 Chemicals 9 7 10 9 10
6 Basic manufactures 17 37 22 20 18
65 Textiles (3) (17) (9) (6) (4)
7 Machinery and transport
equipment 72 53 55 62 63
71 Non-electr. mach. (11) (40) (27) (31) (26)
72 Electr. mach. (1) (11) (11) (9) (10)
73 Transport equipment (49) (1) (18) (23) (27)
8 Misc. manufactures 3 3 13 10 10
84 Clothing (-) (-) (7) (3) (1)
85 Footwear (-) (-) (-) (-) (D
relation between the "Nomenclatura Brasileira de Mercadorias" and SITC was
taken fron Silber (1983, Appendix 2) . Figures in parentheses for 2-digit SITC-
categories.
Source: Own calculations based on UN, Commodity Trade Statistics; Banco Central
do Brasil, Boletim.- 10 -
the regional distribution of Brazilian exports of SITC 7 (Table
A4), the dominant role of ALADI is confirmed. Moreover, the
shares lost by ALADI in the 1970s accrued to other developing
countries rather than developed economies. Consequently, the
Third World accounted for 60-67 percent of total Brazilian
world market sales of machinery and transport equipment over
the whole period under consideration. This underlines the im-
portance of the Third World, and the Latin American market in
particular, for relatively capital-intensive Brazilian exports.
For the period after 1981, similarly disaggregated Information on
Brazilian manufactured exports of different categories to differ-
ent destinations is not available in the sources referred to in
the preceding paragraphs. According to preliminary figures for
1983 (which do not cover all export categories, however), the
trend of rising ALADI shares was reversed in the early 1980s.
Particularly, the US market regained importance, displacing the
ALADI as the most important Single buyer. These shifts must
largely be attributed to demand factors. With the beginning of
widespread debt crises, prospects for exports to the Latin Amer-
ican region were deeply eroded, whereas the US entered an expan-
sionary economic phase with import demand booming. Apparently,
Brazil managed to switch to the more promising US market after
1981 in order to compensate for the slowdown in trade with ALADI,
as the country had succeeded in shifting manufactured exports in
the opposite direction after 1973. This indicates a remarkable
flexibility of Brazilian exporters considering that export condi-
tions and the structure of demand for Brazilian products differed
significantly between both markets.
The analysis shows that export market diversification coupled
with product diversification have characterized Brazil's manu-
factured export Performance since the early 1960s. However, the
Potential for further diversif ication does not seem to be ex-
hausted. There is still plenty of room for further export market
diversification as suggested by the continuous dominance of US
and ALADI markets. The same applies to product differentiation:
Out of the fifteen most important export items in 1981, ten still- 11 -
belonged to the non-manufactures category accounting for nearly
half of total Brazilian exports. Both the search for new markets
and new products could enlarge Brazil's export potential and thus
helps to reduce the bürden of servicing foreign debt and stimu-
lates overall economic growth .
1.2. The Relevance of Demand Factors for Export Expansion
Reference has been made to demand factors influencing Brazil's
export expansion. Since world or regional demand for imports
cannot be influenced by the Brazilian government or by exporters
of this country, the relevance of demand factors for direction
and volume of exports has to be established. Only if demand fac-
tors are not dominating, supply-side effects on the competitive-
ness of Brazilian manufacturing industries come into focus and
the behaviour of exporters as well as government policies matter.
The influence of demand factors on the export Performance can be
separated by constant market share analysis (CMS). In this ap-
proach, export growth is split up into a world trade effect (i.e.
that increase necessary to keep the country's share in world
exports constant), a commodity composition effect, a regional
market concentration effect, and a residual. While the former
effects represent demand factors, the residual is generally re-
ferred to as capturing supply-side effects on international com-
petitiveness. The results of the CMS analysis for Brazil and
different subperiods are presented in Table 1.3. In contrast to
earlier studies , our analysis covers a longer time period and
presents separate calculations for Brazil's major export markets.
However, the principal conclusion remains the same as that of
earlier studies. The results in Table 1.3 point to the supply
side effect as the major source of growth of Brazil's manufac-
tured exports. This applies to all export markets and all sub-
For an empirical analysis of the impact of export expansion on
economic growth in Brazil, see Annex I "Export Expansion and
Growth: The Brazilian Case, 1968-1984".
2 See e.g. Horta (1983), Rosa (1978), Dippl (1986).- 12
Table 1.3 - Constant Market Share Analysis of Brazilian Manufactured Exports
to Different Markets in Different Subperiods, 1962-81 (world
trade, commodity, market and supply-side effects as percent of
actual growth of manufactured exports)
World trade effect
Centrally





































































































Source; Own calculations based on UN, Commodity Trade Statistics.Bibliothek des Instituts
für Weltwirtschaft
- 13 -
periods investigated, except for 1974-78 when demand factors
(world trade effect) dominated and the re-implementation of im-
port Substitution policies in Brazil raight have negatively af-
fected its international competitiveness. These findings provide
sufficient ground to concentrate the subsequent analysis exclu-
sively on supply factors despite some limitations of the CMS
approach .
1.3. Determinants of Brazil's Export Performance; Some Hypotheses
Abstracting from general demand influences, Brazil's manufactur-
ing industries may achieve international competitiveness because
they enjoy a comparative advantage in the production of certain
products vis-ä-vis producers in other countries which accrues
from the country's resource endowment, because similarities of
consumer preferences in Brazil and in other (developing) coun-
tries open up markets for Brazilian exporters, or because Special
trading arrangements and other government interventions provide
an artificial competitive advantage to domestic industries which
do not necessarily possess a comparative advantage in production.
From what has been said before, it is also evident that different
export conditions prevailing in the ALADI region, other develop-
ing countries and developed countries must be taken into account
in determining the roots of international competitiveness of
different manufacturing industries.
According to Standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international
trade, a country should supply products that intensively use the
abundant factors of production. In the case of Brazil, there
still is a large untapped labour supply outside the formal labour
markets which would suggest a comparative advantage in labour-in-
tensive exports. However, for two different reasons, there may
The CMS approach has frequently been criticized with respect to
conceptual limitations and problems in empirical application
(see e.g. Bowen, Pelzman, 1984, p. 461, Leamer, Stern, 1970).
The residual reflects the interaction of both demand and supply
factors, rather than supply factors exclusively. Moreover, CMS
results are quite sensitive to changes in the base year, level
of commodity aggregation, and definition of world market.- 14 -
also be a justification for more capital-intensive exports to
developed economies. New products going through a product cycle
finally become well established in markets and standardized in
production. At this stage, human capital requirements become low
and, notwithstanding a relatively high physical capital intensi-
ty, more advanced developing countries can be supposed to have
comparative advantages in producing such standardized export
items. Physical capital should be much less of a bottleneck than
human skills, due to its international mobility (Wolter, 1975).
Policy distortions stand for the second possible reason for cap-
ital-intensive exports. Misguided economic policies have often
discriminated against labour-intensive activities in many devel-
oping countries and hence have favoured a too capital-intensive
production and export structure as compared to what would have
been adequate given the countries
1 factor endowment. This argu-
ment may also be of some relevance in the case of Brazil. Savasi-
ni (1978) concluded that the export promotion policy implemented
since the mid-1960s has given priority to sectors that absorbed
relatively little labour per unit of final demand.
In exporting to developing countries, competitiveness of Brazil
vis-a-vis exporters located in developed economies may also arise
from similarities in consumer preferences. Brazilian exporters
can be expected to be well prepared to meet developing countries'
import needs since these may be largely in line with domestic
production and demand preferences in Brazil. For example, devel-
oping countries may ask for low-priced products rather than high
quality Standards adhered to in developed countries. Especially
exports to Third World countries that have not yet reached the
industrialization level of Brazil may largely consist of capital-
intensive goods. Compared to other developing countries, Brazil
is probably better equipped with physical capital and human
skills.
As regards exports to ALADI members, additional factors must be
taken into account. Although the Latin American Free Trade Asso-
ciation (LAFTA) did not succeed in liberalizing trade between the
11 member countries as envisaged in the 1960s, preferential trad-- 15 -
ing arrangements favoured trade within LAFTA and discriminated
against imports from third countries. In 1977, about 40 percent
of intra-LAFTA trade flows enjoyed preferential treatment. Pref-
erence margins relative to cif-prices plus tariffs levied on
non-LAFTA imports amounted to 20-30 percent in the 1970s. In this
way, national import Substitution policies were elevated to the
regional level. Hence, Brazilian exports to the Latin American
market are likely to be biased in favour of products that require
large inputs of both physical and human capital (Diaz Alejandro,
1974)
1.
A further hypothesis relates to the heavy fluctuations in rel-
ative importance of Brazilian exports to the Latin American re-
gion. Presumably, it is mainly the ALADI region that serves as a
temporary outlet for excess production at times of depressed
domestic demand in Brazil. Furthermore, exports to ALADI may be
considered to partly offset bottlenecks in selling to developed
countries, due to either sluggish demand or eroded competitive-
ness of Brazilian exports in markets without preferential access
for Brazilian suppliers.
Finally, the Latin American approach of discriminating against
imports from outside the region may have led to distinctly dif-
ferent characteristics of exporting versus non-exporting firms in
Brazil. Import Substitution policies gave rise to foreign direct
investment by multinational corporations which attempted to se-
cure access to Latin American markets. Since multinationals lo-
cated in Brazil will strive for serving the whole ALADI region
and engage in intra-firm trade with parent companies in developed
countries as well, one can assume that these companies may have
been spearheads of export expansion in Brazil. Due to attempts to
Subsequently, export conditions within LAFTA were increasingly
characterized and complicated by bilateral trading arrange-
ments, especially when the Overall liberalization approach was
abandoned and the rather loose cooperation ALADI replaced LAFTA
in 1980. The impact this trend has had on Brazil's exports can
only be assessed in the context of detailed sector studies
scheduled for a later phase of the research project, however.- 16 -
foster intra-industry specialization among ALADI-members, partic-
ipating enterprises may operate at a significantly larger scale
than firras supplying domestic markets only. Moreover, since Bra-
zil belongs to the most advanced economies within ALADI it would
specialize in relatively capital-intensive productions, so that
exporting and non-exporting firms may differ in terms of factor
absorption as well. These hypotheses are subjected to empirical
tests in the subsequent chapters.- 17 -
CHAPTER 2
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, ECONOMIC POLICIES AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE
2.1. Brazil's Revealed Comparative Advantages in Different Mar-
kets
In the following, the international competitiveness of Brazil's
manufacturing industries is measured with export Performance
ratios and the concept of revealed comparative advantage .
- As a first approximation, the international competitiveness
across industries can be compared on the basis of export per-
formance ratios presented in Table 2.1. These ratios compare
Brazil's commodity structure of manufactured exports to the
corresponding structure of world exports (for the formula of
calculation, see footnote to Table 2.1). The basic notion is
that Brazil may possess a competitive advantage (disadvantage)
if the share of an export category in Brazil's total manufac-
tured exports is greater (smaller) than the respective share of
this category in total world exports of manufactures.
- The concept of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) measures
the relative competitiveness of different Brazilian industries
by calculating the excess of its exports over its imports,
relative to total net exports of the Brazilian manufacturing
sector. Thus, the RCA analysis allows for a ranking of the
different Brazilian industries with respect to their interna-
tional competitive position (for the formula of calculation,
see footnote to Table A7). A clear distinction has to be drawn
between the RCA-concept and comparative advantages which ac-
cording to the theory of international trade are assumed to
determine the structure of production and thus also trade pat-
For earlier studies, see for example Lowinger (1971), Tyler
(1972), Rocca and de Barros (1972), Nishijima (1980), Savasini
(1978); for a summarizing discussion of different measures of
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X = value of Brazilian exports
XW = world exports
i = SITC-category (5,6+8,7)
j = region (six export markets)
Source: Own calculations based on UN, Commodity Trade Statistics.- 19 -
terns. Instead of referring to factor endowments, the RCA-con-
cept tries to evaluate the international competitiveness of
industries by referring to their actual export Performance. In
case of serious distortions in goods and factor markets, fa-
vourable RCA-values may result from these distortions rather
than from comparative advantage.
Due to the aforementioned conceptual limitations, the following
analysis of export Performance ratios and RCAs can only serve as
a starting point in assessing the international competitiveness
of Brazilian industries. It will be supplemented by applying the
so-called Lary-concept in analysing factor intensities of Bra-
zilian industries (Section 2.2) and by assessing the role of
economic incentives in explaining Brazil's export Performance
(Section 2.3).
As was to be expected, great differences in export Performance
ratios exist both between SITC-groups and export markets. With
shares of 10-15 percent in total Brazilian manufactured exports
to developed and ALADI countries in the 1970s, chemical exports
were of minor importance for Brazil. According to Table A2, this
industry shows the highest capital intensity within the Brazilian
manufacturing sector. Consequently, the relative international
competitiveness can be expected to be rather poor, particularly
in trade with developed countries. At large, export Performance
ratios and RCAs Support this view. Export Performance ratios are
below one throughout the 1970s, irrespectively of the market
considered. The more detailed analysis of RCAs in Table A7 shows
extremely high negative values (i.e. trade deficits) for almost
all subgroups of SITC 5 in trade with developed countries. In
trade with ALADI and total developing countries, a less uniform
picture emerges: RCAs improved during the 1970s and are signifi-
cantly positive for several subgroups (explosives and plastics in
particular).
Brazil seems to be most competitive in exporting products falling
into the basic and miscellaneous manufactures category (SITC
6-(67+68)+8) which largely consists of relatively labour-inten-- 20 -
sive goods. Export Performance ratios improved considerably dur-
ing the 1960s and early 1970s, probably due to the implementation
of outward-looking economic policies (for details, see Dippl,
1986, pp. 3 ff.). Though still above one, ratios declined after
1973 when Brazil returned to import Substitution policies. Not-
withstanding that this trend applied to all major export markets,
some differences are worth mentioning. Export Performance ratios
were higher than average in case of exports to developed coun-
tries and ALADI members, but considerably lower for non-ALADI
developing countries. The favourable Performance in developed
country markets supports the hypothesis that Brazil is most com-
petitive in manufacturing labour-intensive products vis-ä-vis ad-
vanced economies. High Performance ratios for exports of SITC 6
and 8 to ALADI may be partly attributed to discriminations
against imports from outside the region. Probably, Brazil bene-
fitted from trade diversion at the expense of Asian competitors,
for example. This reasoning is consistent with the comparatively
poor export Performance in non-protected Third World markets.
Net trade measures of Table A7 reveal a somewhat different pic-
ture. At the overall level of basic manufactures (SITC 6) , RCAs
are positive for ALADI and other Third World markets but negative
for the developed country market (apart from 1978). Brazil exper-
ienced a trade surplus in almost all subgroups of SITC 6 with de-
veloping countries and ALADI, except in paper and leather. In
trade with developed economies, positive RCAs are concentrated on
the most labour-intensive sectors (leather, wood, textiles);
trade deficits prevailed in sectors like paper, metallic and
non-metallic mineral products, i.e. more capital-intensive indus-
tries according to Table A2.
RCAs for miscellaneous manufactures (SITC 8) improved during the
1970s for all major export markets of Brazil. However, this trend
started much earlier and was more pronounced for (net) exports to
all developing countries and particularly to ALADI. Probably, it
was harder to achieve competitiveness in exporting miscellaneous
manufactures to developed country markets than to the protected
ALADI market. Again considerable differences exist between indus-- 21 -
tries at the 2-digit SITC-level. Throughout the whole period,
trade Performance with both developing and developed countries
was most favourable for furniture and footwear. Improvements were
most remarkable for travel goods and clothing, especially in
trade with developed" countries. On the other hand, Brazil failed
to achieve trade surpluses vis-ä-vis advanced economies as re-
gards instruments and printed matter.
There is some evidence that the assessment of Brazilian export
prospects would be biased to the lower side if based on RCA cal-
culations. If traditional RCA-values are compared to an index
based on production rather than trade data , the number of sec-
tors with a revealed comparative advantage is greater according
to the latter measure (see Table A8 for the calculation of both




presentation) . This holds true for industries within SITC 8 in
A similar picture emerges with respect to machinery and transport
equipment (SITC 7) . Whereas the so-called Bowen-index indicates
favourable export prospects for many industries belonging to SITC
7, the traditional RCA-concept generally results in negative
values as regards Brazil's trade with the world. However, the net
trade measure (Table A7) as well as export Performance ratios
(Table 2.1) show significant differences between Brazil's major
export markets. For markets in developed countries, RCAs are
negative and export Performance ratios below one throughout the
whole period, but both measures improved considerably after 1973.
Bowen (1983) has proposed to reveal a country's competitive
advantages through its production relative to world production.
This index is considered superior to the traditional RCA-con-
cept since it covers a much wider spectrum of commodities in
which a country may achieve international competitiveness. This
is so because a country produces many more goods than are actu-
ally exported. We present Bowen's index merely as an additional
information since this measure cannot be calculated for sepa-
rate export markets.
2
As has been noted already, export Performance ratios show a
more favourable picture in case of SITC 6+8 as well.- 22 -
Production may have become more standardized so that Brazil will
achieve competitiveness in developed country markets if this
trend continues. On the other hand, Brazil experienced surpluses
in trade with total developing countries and the ALADI region.
Export Performance ratios were above or very close to one. The
Performance was most remarkable in non-electrical machinery and
transport equipment. Presumably, preferential trading arrange-
ments within ALADI gave a major impetus to Brazilian exports of
these categories to the protected Latin American market. However,
the success in trade with other developing countries as well
supports the hypothesis that Brazil is competitive in exporting
relatively capital-intensive products to less advanced economies,
since it is well equipped with physical and human capital com-
pared to the majority of developing countries. Expectations are
confirmed that Brazil was better prepared than developed coun-
tries to meet developing countries• import needs due to simi-
larities in demand. Exports of vehicles have gone almost exclu-
sively to developing countries, for example (World Bank, 1983, p.
119) . This was partly related to similar fuel conditions in the
importing countries (i.e. low octane fuel) and better adaption to
the typically rough road conditions in the Third World .
2.2. Factor Use and Export Performance of Brazilian Industries
The analysis in the preceding paragraphs has shown significant
differences in Brazilian trade patterns with developed economies
on the one hand and developing countries (especially ALADI-mem-
bers) on the other. In trade with advanced countries, Brazil's
export Performance was most favourable in products generally
considered as labour-intensive. This was predicted by Standard
Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade according to which
the potential for export growth lies on products that intensively
use the relatively abundant factor of production. In trade with
developing countries, competitiveness was achieved in more capi-
The export Performance of Brazil was most favourable for mul-
tiple use pick-ups and Utility vehicles, i.e. types of vehicles
which are best adapted to rough use.- 23 -
tal-intensive industries as well, which again is consistent with
expectations raised in Section 1.3.
However, after 1973 Brazil considerably expanded its exports of
machinery and transport equipment to developed countries as well,
so that the differences in the commodity composition of Brazilian
manufactured exports to its major trading partners were somewhat
reduced. It is mainly this observation that requires further
investigation, since conflicting hypotheses are involved. A first
hypothesis suggests an explanation in terms of factor absorption
in Brazilian industries. Notwithstanding high overall capital
intensity, Brazil may have comparative advantage in machinery and
transport equipment if products are of a highly standardized
nature (product-cycle goods). On the other hand, it may be attri-
buted to policy induced distortions (i.e. economic policies con-
flicting with comparative advantage) that export structures be-
came more similar after 1973. Before discussing the role of eco-
nomic policies in Section 2.3, the well-known Lary-concept is
applied to test the former hypothesis. Moreover, by referring to
this concept, the relationship between factor absorption and Bra-
zilian trade patterns is reconsidered in this section.
The Lary-concept (Lary, 1968) Claims that under certain assump-
tions value added per employee in different industries can be
taken as a proxy for capital intensity . A figure above the aver-
age for total manufacturing indicates relatively high capital
intensity of an industry and vice versa. In contrast to the index
of overall capital intensity referred to in Table A2 (based on
capital investment per employee), separate measures of physical
and human capital intensity can be calculated by applying the
Lary-concept. This is most important in the context of the prod-
uct cycle hypothesis. Standardized product-cycle goods are char-
Factor intensities can only be calculated for total production
rather than export production, since information on value added
or wage content of exports is not available. Furthermore, re-
sults may be biased due to differences in factor and product
market distortions between industries. Thus, Lary-measures pro-
vide an approximation to reality only (for a more detailed
discussion, see Wolter, 1975, pp. 31 ff.).- 24 -
acterized by minor human skill requirements, but may still absorb
considerable amounts of physical capital. According to Lary,
human capital intensity is indicated by high wage content in
value added per employee and physical capital intensity by high
non-wage value added per employee, respectively.
Table 2.2 presents factor intensities for 15 Brazilian manufac-
turing industries relative to averages for total manufacturing .
Three different groups of industries can be identified with re-
spect to overall relative capital intensity:
- Footwear, wearing apparel, wood and cork products, furniture
and fixtures, leather and für products, and textiles are clear-
ly labour-intensive, since value added per employee is signifi-
cantly below average.
- Non-electrical machinery, food products, plastics, and printing
and Publishing ränge in the middle, with overall capital inten-
sities near the average for total manufacturing industries.
- The group of relatively capital-intensive industries consists
of transport equipment, paper, electrical machinery, rubber
products, and other chemicals (in ascending order).
Industries are defined according to International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC). Data are presented for all
Brazilian manufacturing industries for which information is
available in the 1984 edition of UNIDO, Handbook of Industrial
Statistics. Tables A10-A12 provide additional information on
factor intensities in Brazil relative to various country groups
that stand for its major trading partners. That is because one
of the crucial assumptions in deducing comparative advantage
from relative factor intensities is that of non-existence of
factor intensity reversals. According to correlations run for
factor intensities in Brazil (value added, wages and non-wage
value added per employee) on the one hand and the corresponding
figures for developed market economies, high and middle income
developing countries, and ALADI, respectively, on the other
hand, this assumption seems to be justified. All Spearman rank
correlation coefficients are significantly positive at the 3
percent level at least.— OK





















































































Kelative to total manufacturing industries (= 100).
Source; UNIDO, Handbook of Industrial Statistics 1984. - Own calculations.- 26 -
As regards the product cycle hypothesis, the last mentioned group
is of particular interest. Comparing Brazil with average figures
for developed market economies, there is indeed some evidence
pointing to international competitiveness of Brazil based on
standardization. Whereas physical capital intensity for the in-
dustries of this group is only marginally lower in Brazil as
compared to developed countries (or even higher as in electrical
machinery and transport equipment), human capital intensity is
2.9 to 4.4 times higher in developed countries (Tables All and
A12). However, all Brazilian industries with high overall capital
intensity (i.e. ISIC-categories 341, 352, 383, 384) show above
average human capital intensity as well, so that the standardiza-
tion argument does not apply to them.
Ranking all Brazilian industries according to wages and non-wage
value added per employee, a strongly positive correlation between
human and physical capital intensity emerges. The Spearman coef-
ficient of 0.65 is significant at the 1 percent level, whereas
the same correlation remains insignificant in the case of devel-
oped market economies (0.30). Thus, the potential for developing
countries to achieve international competitiveness via speciali-
zation in standardized product-cycle goods may well exist. How-
ever, Brazil does not seem to have grasped this opportunity to a
significant extent. Only the food industry and the plastics in-
dustry, both of an average overall capital intensity, should be
competitive in world markets due to relatively low human capital
intensity. In the paper industry, relative human capital intensi-
ty is considerably below relative overall capital intensity,
though still above the average for total manufacturing. The rela-
tive position of machinery and transport equipment in human skill
requirements is even more unfavourable than with respect to over-
all capital intensity. Probably, the success of these industries
in exporting to developed economies has to be attributed to poli-
cy induced distortions rather than to standardization.
For rubber products, the differentiation of value added into
wage and non-wage components is not possible due to missing
data.- 27 -
This conclusion is supported by correlation analysis, relating
factor absorption in Brazilian industries to export Performance
in different markets . Table 2.3 presents Spearman and Pearson
coefficients for correlations between overall, human and physical
capital intensity in Brazilian industries on the one hand and the
share of the respective industries in total manufactured exports
of Brazil to its major markets in various years (and the change
2
in export shares) on the other . First of all, the results con-
firm the strict difference in export patterns of Brazil to dif-
ferent markets . In exporting to developing countries and, par-
ticularly, to ALADI, a positive relationship between capital in-
tensity and export shares is evident. Over the whole period under
consideration, industries with the most favourable export per-
formance in the ALADI region absorbed relatively large amounts of
capital, both human and physical capital. The stability of this
relationship is confirmed by the rather small and insignificant
coefficients for correlations between the change in export shares
in 1967-73 and 1973-81 and factor intensities.
On the other hand, a clearly negative relationship between capi-
tal intensity and export shares is shown for Brazilian exports to
The following analysis is based on a sample of 13 industries
which accounted for 81 percent of total manufactured exports of
Brazil in 1981. Food products (ISIC 311/2) are neglected be-
cause they are not considered as manufactured exports in Table
A6; for "other chemicals" (ISIC 352), the SITC-classification
does not provide a corresponding category.
2
Data on factor intensities is for industries defined according
to ISIC, whereas trade data is based on SITC-classification of
industries. The relationship between industrial and trade clas-
sif ication has been established in a rather crude manner. For
example, the calculation of export shares is based on manufac-
tured exports exclusively, though some ISIC-categories include
products belonging to SITC-groups 2 and 4 as well. Moreover,
2-digit SITC-categories are not further disaggregated so that
the definition of industries is not completely consistent. Con-
sequently, the results must be interpreted with some caution.
Both Spearman rank correlations and Pearson correlations large-
ly reveal the same results. Thus, Pearson coefficients are re-
ported only if rank correlations show statistically significant
coefficients whereas Pearson coefficients remain insignificant,
and vice versa. Generally, rank correlation analysis shows
better results in terms of significance.- 28 -
Table 2.3 - Spearman and Pearson Coefficients for Correlations between Factor Intensities
























































































































































aCorrelations are run between factor intensities as reported in Table 2.2 and export
shares of the respective industries in total Brazilian manufactured exports to various
markets as reported in Table A6. "A" denot«
3« the change in export shares in percentage
points. Pearson coefficients are given only if correlation results differ between both
procedures, i.e. Spearman rank correlations being statistically significant and Pearson
correlations remaining insignificant, and vice versa. - *** significant at the 1 percent
level; ** 5 percent level; * 10 percent level. - In parentheses: in percent.
Source: Tables 2.2 and A6. - Own calculations.- 29 -
developed countries, which is in line with Standard Heckscher-Oh-
lin theory of international trade. A closer look at the results
for this export market reveals further interesting insights:
- Contrary to the product cycle hypothesis, correlation coeffi-
cients do not differ very much when export shares in 1967, 1973
and 1981 are related to human capital intensity on the one hand
and physical capital intensity on the other. According to the
standardization argument, the negative relationship between
capital intensity and export shares should be stronger (rather
than weaker as indicated in Table 2.3) for wages per employee
than for non-wage value added per employee.
- It may still be argued that the standardization argument is
relevant, considering the strongly negative correlation between
human capital intensity and the change in export shares in
1967-73, when the coefficient remains insignificant for physi-
cal capital intensity. However, this interpretation conflicts
with the significantly positive coefficient calculated for
human capital intensity in the period 1973-81.
- Trade related economic policies of the Brazilian government
seem to have influenced Brazil's export Performance in world
markets. Relating capital intensity to the change in export
shares, coefficients are negative (though not significant at
the 10 percent level in many cases) for 1967-73, i.e. when the
government shifted to a more outward-oriented development ap-
proach and reduced the conflict between Brazil's comparative
advantages and policy distortions arising from import Substitu-
tion policies. Coefficients are positive for 1973-81, when the
country returned to an active import Substitution policy after
the first oil price shock of 1973. Consequently, the negative
relationship between capital intensity and export shares is
most evident in 1973, but considerably weaker in 1967 and 1981.
- The hypothesis that the favourable export Performance of Bra-
zilian machinery and transport equipment industries in devel-- 30 -
oped countries must be partly attributed to policy induced
distortions is supported by correlation analysis as well. When
electrical and non-electrical machinery as well as transport
equipment are excluded from the analysis (Table AI3), the nega-
tive relationship between capital intensity and export shares
becomes considerably stronger, compared to correlation results
for all industries.
2.3. Economic Policies towards Exports and Brazil's Export Per-
formance
2.3.1. Relevance_of_Economic_Policies2_IntroductorY_Remarks
According to the evidence presented in the preceding sections,
there is enough reason to consider trade related economic poli-
cies as an important reason in explaining the favourable export
Performance of Brazil in the past :
- The analysis of revealed comparative advantage has shown that
the share of Brazilian exports from industries with positive
RCA-values in total manufactured exports improved from 80 and
68 percent in 1962 for exports destined to developing countries
and ALADI-members, respectively, to 97 percent for both regions
in 1981 (Table A14). However, a different picture emerged with
respect to exports to developed countries. In this case, the
trend of rising export shares of industries with positive RCA-
values (1962: 17 percent; 1973: 61 percent) was reversed after
1973 (1981: 34 percent), which may be attributed to the shift
in economic policies after the first oil price shock.
- The correlation analysis between factor intensities and export
Performance pointed to the relevance of economic policies as
For former studies that have dealt with the effect of export
incentives and other trade policies on Brazilian export expan-
sion, see Bergsman (1970), Tyler (1976, 1980, 1983), Savasini
(1978), Carvalho, Haadad (1978), Musalem (1984), and Teitel,
Thoumi (1986); for a review, see Braga, Markwald (1983).- 31 -
well. For exports to developed countries, the (negative) re-
lationship between capital intensity and export shares was most
evident in 1973, but weakened considerably later on.
The analysis of Brazilian economic policies towards exports may
have implications for the future export prospects of this country
as well. It may be argued that export expansion cannot be sus-
tained in the long run if mainly based on policy induced distor-
tions that are in conflict with Brazil's comparative advantages.
It is in two ways that economic policies affect the export per-
formance of a country. Firstly, overall financial and monetary
policies of developing countries frequently result in domestic
inflation rates in excess of world market price increases. Thus,
the global international competitiveness of these countries
1
manufäcturing sectors depends on whether the exchange rate is
flexible enough to correct for divergencies between the national
and the international price trend. Changes in the exchange rate
affect at the same rate the different branches of the manufäctur-
ing sector. In case of domestic inflation exceeding inflation
abroad, a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency to the
amount of the inflation differential is required to keep the real
exchange rate and thus international price competitiveness con-
stant.
Secondly, in addition to determining the global competitiveness
of manufäcturing by the exchange rate policy, economic policies
are likely to affect the relative competitiveness of different
industries. Typically, economic incentives like fiscal and finan-
cial bonuses and protectionist measures are not evenly distribu-
ted, but rather discriminate between industries. Thus, the inter-
industry allocation of production factors is affected and domes-
tic producers would concentrate on activities where the official-
ly granted incentives are particularly high. The resulting pat-
tern of industrial specialization may well be in conflict with
the country's comparative advantages, i.e. international competi-
tiveness of industries may be artificially created by policy
induced distortions rather than based on an efficient use of
factors of production according to the country's relative factor- 32 -
endowments. At the prevailing exchange rate, high-cost producing
firras may successfully compete in international markets because
of firm- or industry-specific export subsidies, in particular.
In the following sections, the impact of major economic policy
instruments on Brazilian export Performance is empirically ana-
lysed. Section 2.3.2. focuses on the determinants of global com-
petitiveness of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. Subsequently,
it is discussed as to how industry-specific incentives affected
the pattern of industrial specialization in Brazil.
2.3.2. Possible_Determinants_of_Manufactured_Exgort_Growth
Previous findings based on time-series analysis suggest that the
real exchange rate has been an important determinant of Brazil's
export Performance in the manufacturing sector. Surprisingly,
however, the real effective exchange rate (i.e. accounting for
export subsidies) proved to be insignificant (Dippl, 1986, pp. 16
ff.). A possible explanation of the latter result may be that
Dippl's analysis failed to consider different export conditions
in Brazil's major export markets . Thus, separate time-series
regressions are run for Brazilian manufactured exports to various
destinations in the following. The underlying data base Covers
the period 1968-81
2.
The equation estimated for different export markets can be writ-
ten as follows :
Another explanation may be that the measure for export sub-
sidies generally applied does not reflect the net effect of
Brazilian trade policies on exports (see Section 2.3.3).
2
For the calculation of real and real effective exchange rates,
see Annex II.
As in many other studies, the small country assumption is used,
i.e. the exporting country faces a perfectly elastic demand
curve. This seems adequate, as it has been shown that Brazil
faces a highly though not perfectly elastic demand for its ex-
ports. In an empirical study, it was found that price elastici-
ties ranged between -2.2 and -7.6 in the long run (Braga, Mark-
wald, 1983). In addition, the correlation coefficient between
the price indices for manufactured exports of Brazil on the one
hand and industrialized countries on the other turned out to be
0.93.- 33 -
LX = aQ + ax(LPXB + LEP) + a2 L(l+s) + a. LU + a. LQM
where:
L = logarithm;
LX = Brazilian manufactured exports in constant US$ amount
(nominal value of exports in US$ to each market deflated
by the index of Brazilian manufactured export prices
also in US$, as published by Getülio Vargas Foundation,
Conjuntura Econömica, 1975=100); the suffix W, A, U, E
and R in Table 2.4 Stands for exports to the world,
ALADI, US, Western Europe and rest of the world, respec-
tively;
LPXB = index of Brazilian manufactured export prices in US$;
LEP = log (E/WP ), where E is the index of the average nominal
exchange rate between the Cruzeiro and the US$ (item rf
in IMF, International Financial Statistics) and WP is
the wholesale price index for Brazil (item 63 in IFS;
1975=100);
1+s = export subsidies (see Table A.II.2);
LU = recession-boom variable, proxied by the use of installed
capacity in the Brazilian industrial sectors (Getülio
Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura Econömica; IBGE);
LQM = index of total manufactured Output in real terms (1975=
100) .
This equation presents the supply of exports as a function of the
profitability of exports vis-ä-vis the domestic market, also
known as the real exchange rate for exporters. This variable is
split between the real price of exports (LPXB + LEP) and export
subsidies to determine the separate influence of both economic
policies (i.e. exchange rate policies and export subsidies) on
export Performance. It is expected that the coefficients of both
variables have a positive sign. The recession-boom variable cap-
tures the fact that in periods of slackening domestic demand
local producers may try to seil more abroad to reduce idle capa-- 34 -
Table 2.4 - Regression Results on Major Determinants of Brazilian Exports to
Various Markets, 1968-81
I. World
LXW = 25.0547 - 0.2923 (LPXB+LEP) + 2.9392 L(l+s) - 5.9109 LU + 2.2766
(3.3967) (-0.4839) (1.7443) (-3.9368) (5.0994)
R
2 = 0.87 F(4,9) = 20.318 DW = 1.037 SER = 0.1789 p = 0.6872 (2)
II. ALADI
LXA = 32.1036 - 0.2116 (LPXB+LEP) + 0.7930 L(l+s) - 7.7074 LU + 2.2496 LCM
(4.4710) (-0.3397) (0.4662) (-5.2676) (5.2105)
R
2 = 0.85 F(4,9) = 17.3138 DW = 1.208 SER = 0.1833 p = 0.6113 (2)
III. USA
LXU = 18.9330 - 0.1453 (LPXB+LEP) + 4.9319 L(l+s) - 4.9362 LU + 1.7914 LCM
(2.4669)(-0.2119) (2.6593) (-3.0810) (3.8867)
R
2 = 0.70 F(4,9) = 7.5329 DW = 1.450 SER = 0.2014 p = 0.5684 (2)
IV. Western Europe (EEC+EFTA)
LXE = 18.8446 - 0.5802 (LPXB+LEP) + 3.8904 L(l+s) - 4.1519 LU + 2.0862 LQM
(2.2018)(-0.6979) (1.7629) (-2.3108) (4.0530)
R
2 = 0.58 F(4,9) = 4.1728 DW = 1.687 SER = 0.2455 p = 0.4126 (2)
V. Rest of the world
LXR = 19.4691 - 0.0631 (LPXB+LEP) + 4.5133 L(l+s) - 6.2334 LU + 2.8905 LCM
(1.9009) (-0.0708) (1.8567) (-2.9859) (4.6943)
R
2 = 0.51 F(4,9) = 3.9380 DW = 1.272 SER = 0.2621 p = 0.6074 (3)
ror definition of variables, see the text; t-values in parentheses beneath
regression coefficients. The roodel was estimated through first order serial
correlation of the error maximum likelihood iterative technique. Number of
iterations in parentheses next to the final value of RHO.
Source: Own calculations.- 35 -
city. Manufactured Output is included to show that the higher
overall Output the higher are exports.
This approach certainly has some limitations considering the
major objective of the analysis, i.e. to identify differences in
export determinants between ~Brazil's principal export markets.
This would have required a region-wise definition of explaining
variables LPXB (export prices) and E (exchange rate). Moreover,
it would have been more appropriate to calculate separate indices
of s (export subsidies), LU (recession-boom variable) and LQM
(total Output) for major export markets as well, as weighted
averages of sector-specific indices. However, data restrictions
rendered this impossible so that a uniform definition of ex-
plaining variables had to be applied.
Probably, it is largely due to the aforementioned limitations
that the regression results presented in Table 2.4 only partly
confirm our expectations. This refers to coefficients of (LPXB +
LEP) , in particular, which turned out to be statistically in-
significant for all export markets. There is additional reason
why this result cannot be interpreted as if the real exchange
rate is not a relevant variable to foster export expansion. Bra-
zilian authorities have carried out an exchange rate policy
during much of the period considered in our estimations that has
managed to reduce real exchange rate instability and thus un-
certainty for exporters . This can be viewed as a necessary con-
dition to expand exports after decades of inward-oriented devel-
opment. Technically, however, the exchange rate variable did not
experience enough variability to be statistically significant.
Both total Output and the recession-boom variable proved to be
significant for all export markets of Brazil. In all cases, co-
efficients have the expected sign, i.e. positive for LQM and
negative for LU. The coefficient of the recession-boom variable
In the mid-1960s, Brazilian authorities implemented a passive
crawling peg that closely followed a purchasing power parity
rule. This System was largely maintained, sometimes interrupted
by maxi-devaluations, as in 1979 and 1983 for example.- 36 -
is shown to be extremely high for exports to the ALADI region.
Moreover, the level of significance is by far the highest in this
case. This supports the hypothesis that Brazilian exporters con-
sidered ALADI as their first export outlet at times of sluggish
demand in the dornestic market. Special trading arrangements among
Latin-American countries rendered it relatively easy to switch
from domestic markets to ALADI markets. Probably, subsidiaries of
multinational companies located in Brazil but producing for the
whole region made use of such preferences in particular.
Export subsidies are found to be important in explaining exports
of Brazilian manufactured goods as well. However, again interest-
ing differences exist, especially between Brazil's two most im-
portant export markets, ALADI and the US. Subsidies were most
relevant for exports to the US, in terms of both size and signif-
icance of the regression coefficient. On the contrary, exports to
ALADI were not significantly affected by subsidies. This may be
surprising since Brazilian exports to ALADI largely consisted of
machinery and transport equipment, i.e. relatively capital-in-
tensive goods. Such exports could be expected to require heavy
subsidies in order to be competitive internationally. However,
whereas this reasoning may hold as regards relatively capital-
intensive exports to developed countries, it is hardly relevant
in the case of ALADI. Within the protected ALADI market, Brazil
can be assumed to be competitive in relatively capital-intensive
productions since it is well advanced in terms of both physical




Notwithstanding that the hypothesis of policy induced exports was
substantiated by regression analysis in the preceding paragraphs,
some questions still remain to be settled. Brazil's recent suc-
cess in exporting rather capital-intensive products even to de-
veloped countries, for example, requires a closer look at econo-- 37 -
mic policies affecting exports. Most importantly, export incen-
tives must be considered . at the sectoral level (in order to ac-
count for differences between various industries and thus alloca-
tion effects) and assessed on a net basis, i.e. adjusted for
export-retarding effects of import protection. This could not be
done in time-series analysis due to the lack of adequate data.
Both import and export policies have an impact on the export
prospects of a country. Import Substitution policies are likely
to negatively affect the international competitiveness of poten-
tial exporters. Government protection of import substituting
activities by import tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers pro-
vides domestic suppliers with the opportunity to raise product
prices beyond world market levels. In other words, national sup-
pliers can successfully compete in domestic markets, notwith-
standing that their production costs exceed the production costs
of foreign producers. Import Substitution policies discriminate
against potential exporters of the counbry because, in case of
import tariffs, the price of imported inputs is artificially
raised (as compared to unrestricted trade conditions), and im-
ports are not available in sufficient amount in case of quanti-
tative restrictions. If exporters have to replace imports by
domestically produced inputs, their international competitiveness
is eroded because of relatively poor quality and/or higher prices
of domestic supplies as compared to world market Standards.
In order to compensate for direct cost disadvantages arising from
import Substitution policies, exporting firms may be granted
privileged access to imported inputs. The government may provide
duty-free imports for exporters, establish so-called free activi-
ty zones, or refund tariff payments via drawback schemes. Income
tax exemptions and other export subsidies may help to reduce the
anti-export bias resulting from artificially.increased prices of
domestic inputs. To the extent that Privileges for exporters
compensate for the export-retarding effects of import restric-
tions, they merely establish a balanced structure of economic
incentives granted to exporters and producers supplying the do-- 38 -
mestic market. Only if incentive rates granted to exporting firms
exceed the level of import protection, the trade related policies
of a country are biased in favour of exports.
In the case of Brazil, the net effect of export promotion meas-
ures is difficult to assess, due to the variety and complexity of
export incentives (for a detailed presentation of export incen-
tives and methods of quantification, see World Bank, 1983, Chap-
ter VI). The Brazilian System of fiscal and financial incentives
to manufactured exports was established during the years of eco-
nomic liberalization in the mid-1960s and reinforced later on.
Export incentives have been used in a rather discretionary way to
compensate for exchange rate variations and to support specific
industries. Fiscal incentives consisted of:
- the exemption of indirect taxes on exports;
- the drawback scheine which provided for the restitution of du-
ties and taxes paid by exporters on imported production inputs;
- the reduction of corporate profit taxes for exporters;
- the BEFIEX-scheme (Beneficios Fiscais a Programas Especiais de
Exportacao) which was established in 1972 as a System of enter-
prise-specific export incentive packages based on long-term
export commitments;
- the export tax credit scheme (credito pre^nio) which was the
most important subsidy to exports in the 1970s. Until 1979, the
scheme was related to payments of sales taxes and its rates
were generally identical to the sales tax rates for different
products. The credito pr§mio was abolished as a general incen-
tive in December 1979. When it was re-introduced in early 1981,
the system was altered insofar as a uniform rate was set for
all products, and the credito pre"mio could be used immediately
for payments of all tax obligations.- 39 -
In addition to fiscal incentives, two programs for the financing
of manufactured exports were in Operation. Under the FINEX-pro-
gram (Fund for Export Financing), the foreign trade department of
the Central Bank (CACEX, i.e. Carteira de Comercio Exterior)
financed manufactured exports at subsidized terms in the pre-
shipment and postshipment stages. The other main credit program
directed to manufactured export financing was the so-called Reso-
lution 674. This program "aimed at supplying working capital to
the firms producing manufactured exports, but the operating pro-
cedures of this scheme, as well as the terms and conditions of
the loans granted under the program, place it closer to a cash
subsidy financed through the monetary budget than to an export
credit" (World Bank, 1983, p. 65).
Table 2.5 indicates considerable differences in fiscal and finan-
cial export incentives granted to various Brazilian manufacturing
industries in 1980. Expressed as a percentage of export sales,
export incentives were concentrated on textiles, clothing and
footwear (30 percent), i.e. traditional and labour-intensive
export items on the one hand, and machinery and transport equip-
ment (29-36 percent) on the other. They were considerably lower
for industries like printing, tobacco, beverages, processed food,
perfumery and chemicals (10-14 percent).
In order to fully capture economic policy effects on the export
Performance of Brazil, a simultaneous look at import protection
is required. Column (4) of Table 2.5 presents an estimate of
implicit nominal protection in various industries based on direct
price comparisons between domestic and world market prices as of
late 1980 and early 1981 . When domestic prices are higher
(lower) than foreign prices of the same product, domestic (over-
seas) sales by Brazilian producers are stimulated. The dispersion
Average implicit tariffs obtained from price comparisons be-
tween domestic and world market prices were adjusted for pro-
duction subsidies to obtain the level of implicit nominal pro-
tection (for details, see World Bank, 1983, pp. 73 ff.). The
calculation of implicit tariffs (11.9 percent for total manu-
facturing, on an average) revealed a remarkable degree of re-






































































































































































































































































Classification according to Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE) ; the definition of manufacturing is broader
according to IBGE than in international statistics. - In contrast to columns (1) - (5) where the comparison of incentives to
exports and domestic sales is done at the prevailing exchange rate, adjusted measures take account of policy induced distortions
in the exchange rate; in this latter case, the relevant world market prices are converted to Cruzeiros at the exchange rate that
would have prevailed if policy distortions did not exist.
Source: World Bank (1983, Tables 36-38).- 41 -
of import protection among industries was even wider than in the
case of export incentives . The spectrum ranged from negative
nominal protection - i.e. world prices exceeding domestic prices
in Brazil - in paper, rubber and non-metallic minerals, especial-
ly, to positive values of more than 90 percent of domestic sales
in pharmaceuticals and miscellaneous industries. The typical
structure of protection in developing countries featuring highest
protection for consumer goods and lowest for capital goods, found
in previous studies as well as in Brazil's nominal legal tariff
rates of end-1980, is completely reversed when calculating impli-
cit nominal protection (capital goods: 37.8 percent; intermediate
products: 25.2 percent; consumer goods: 13.1 percent).
In some industries, high export incentives went along with low or
even negative import protection. The most striking example in
this respect was transport equipment. In many other cases, high
export incentives were eroded by even higher incentives to do-
mestic sales, however. For example, electrical equipment was
granted export incentives as high as in transport equipment, but
domestic prices were considerably above international levels in
electrical equipment industries. Thus, the analysis of economic
policies to exports should focus on the net effects of export
promotion and import protection. The anti-export bias (if nega-
tive: pro-export bias) given in column (5) of Table 2.5 provides
a measure of the relative incentive to seil in the export or
domestic markets. The Interpretation of this measure is as fol-
lows: Fiscal and financial incentives to exports averaged 20.8
percent of the export value of total manufacturing, whereas im-
plicit nominal protection applying to domestic sales of manufac-
tured goods amounted to 22.8 percent. Consequently, the price in
Cruzeiros received by an average Brazilian exporter was 2 percent
below the price of a domestic sale of the same good.
1
This is evident from Table AI5 as well, where it is shown that
nominal import tariffs experienced a substantial increase from
1973 to 1980. However, differences between industries were
considerable: for example, the mark-up amounted to 7 and 18
percentage points for pharmaceuticals and machinery, respec-
tively, but more than 100 percentage points for perfumery and
plastics.- 42 -
Though the anti-export bias was negligible at the global level of
total manufacturing, domestic prices considerably exceeded export
prices (including fiscal and financial incentives) in several
industries in 1980. The anti-export bias was highest in pharma-
ceuticals (79 percent), miscellaneous industries (78 percent),
Chemicals (42 percent) and electrical equipment (36 percent). A
reverse Situation appeared in 11 out of the 21 industries listed,
where export incentives exceeded import protection. Transport
equipment experienced the highest relative bias in favour of
exports (anti-export bias: -40 percent), followed by rubber (-33
percent), non-metallic minerals (-32 percent) and paper (-31
percent). The dispersion of the anti-export bias among industries
was as wide as implicit import protection and thus considerable
policy induced effects on the allocation of production factors
among industries were to be expected. Rank correlation shows that
no significant relationship existed between the absolute level of
export incentives received by industries (column 3) and the anti-
export bias (column 5) ; the Spearman correlation coefficient
amounted to -0.05.
The measure indicating the policy effects on exports may still be
improved upon. In the preceding paragraphs, incentives to exports
and domestic sales were calculated at the official exchange rate
prevailing in 1980. However, policy distortions affect the ex-
change rate as well. Thus, exchange rate adjusted export incen-
tive rates and protection rates provide a more accurate measure
of the amount by which prices for exports and domestic sales re-
ceived by Brazilian producers exceeded or feil short of world
prices. To calculate adjusted incentive rates, a shadow exchange
rate has to be applied which would have prevailed in the absence
of policy distortions . The shadow exchange rate estimated by the
World Bank for 1980 is shown to be 16.7 percent above the actual
rate, i.e. policy distortions resulted in an overvaluation of the
Cruzeiro.
The shadow exchange rate is defined as the rate that takes into
account the impact of taxes, subsidies and other policy meas-
ures on the exchange rate but does not require the balance of
payments to be in equilibrium (for alternative definitions of
the shadow exchange rate and methods of calculation, see World
Bank, 1983, p. 78 and Annex 2).- 43 -
Columns (6) - (8) in Table 2.5 present estimates of incentive
rates by adjusting the figures of columns (3) - (5) for the
aforementioned exchange rate effects. When accounting for the
overvaluation of the Cruzeiro, both average export incentives and
nominal protection granted to total manufacturing are considerab-
ly reduced, i.e. the incentives can be largely viewed as compen-
sation for policy induced distortions in the exchange rate. How-
ever, the wide dispersion of incentives among industries remains
untouched. Moreover, the average anti-export bias does not change
significantly. The changes in the anti-export bias at the indus-
try level are also very small and the ranking of industries ac-
cording to the adjusted anti-export bias is the same as above.
The measurement of policy effects on exports may be further im-
proved if effective rather than nominal incentives to exports and
domestic sales are compared. In case of nominal incentives, the
focus is on differences between the price for exports (including
subsidies) and domestic sales received by Brazilian producers on
the one hand and the world price on the other. However, effective
incentives received depend not only on the price of the product
but also on the prices paid for the inputs used in the production
process. Effective incentive rates to domestic sales are pre-
sented in column (9) of Table 2.5. Attempts have also been made
to estimate effective export promotion in Brazil (see e.g. Tyler,
1981b) , but they are subject to considerable limitations . The
results obtained are largely consistent with the estimates of
nominal export incentives, both in terms of absolute amount and
distribution among industries (World Bank, 1983, p. 87). Thus, it
seems adequate to refer to anti-export bias calculations based on
nominal incentives in the following analysis.
In Tyler's estimations (presently not available for the pub-
lic) , BEFIEX (special program of fiscal incentives for expor-
ters) and drawback incentives are .excluded. Furthermore, the
calculation of financial incentives is based on legal rates
rather than actual amounts of financing. Export incentives
received through reductions in the price of imported inputs
under the BEFIEX and drawback schemes are taken into account in
the nominal calculation, however. Only the differences in do-
mestic prices of inputs produced in Brazil with respect to
their world prices are not considered.- 44 -
2.3.4. Anti-Export Bias and Export Performance
The calculations presented above have shown an enormous disper-
sion of protection and export incentive rates among industries
which "goes well beyond what would be desirable on the basis of a
limited number of well established priorities for industrial and
export development" (World Bank, 1983, p. 89). Policy measures
were adopted on grounds other than clearly defined industrial
priorities and included many discretionary elements. This may
have resulted in additional price distortions and inefficiencies
due to the misallocation of production factors. Probably, the
rather complex system of incentives gave rise to unintended side-
effects or even contradictory policies. This may apply to the
electrical equipment industry, for example, which received an
extremely high level of import protection but was granted top
priority in export promotion, simultaneously.
Some of the large differences in net incentives to exports may
reflect Brazilian policy priorities, however. The striking re-
versal of the traditional structure of import protection, i.e.
capital goods industries receiving the highest and consumer goods
industries the lowest level of protection in 1980, may be attrib-
uted to infant industry arguments and the success of more tradi-
tional industries in achieving international competitiveness, for
example. Notwithstanding the discretionary and contradictory
policy elements, there is thus reason to raise the question where
the major thrust of export promotion in Brazil was placed. It is
most interesting to know whether the recent success in exporting
rather capital-intensive products to other than the protected
ALADI markets was related to an economic policy bias towards
capital-intensive exports.
In previous studies, it has been shown that specific export in-
centives discriminated against labour-intensive industries. This
applied to the export tax credit scheme (credito pre"mio) , in
particular (Pastore, Savasini, Rosa, 1978). The following ana-
lysis explores the relationship between overall incentives to- 45 -
exports of various industries, relative to domestic sales, and
factor intensities . As incentive rate, the adjusted anti-export
bias is considered in the first place; factor absorption is for
overall, human and physical capital.
Table 2.6 indicates that expört promotion policies in Brazil were
somewhat biased towards rather capital-intensive productions.
An adjusted negative anti-export bias (i.e. pro-export bias) went
along with relatively high value added per employee, i.e. overall
capital intensity. The policy discrimination against labour-in-
tensive industries seems to be relatively strong when industries
with positive net incentive rates to exports are compared
Table 2.6 - The Relationship between Policy Incentives and Factor
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negative (-21.9) 16.0 (4)
low (10.2) 12.3 (4)











Unweighted averages; in parentheses: number of industries.
Source: Tables 2.2 and 2.5
Factor intensities are those calculated in Table 2.2, i.e. on
the basis of ISIC-classification of industries, whereas infor-
mation on incentives in Table 2.5 is according to IBGE indus-
trial classification. Moreover, the comparison of factor inten-
sities and incentive rates could be done for only 12 industries
out of 21 sectors listed in Table 2.5, due to data limitations
as regards factor intensities and reasons of comparison between
ISIC- and IBGE-classifications. Thus, the results present
rather crude indications and should be interpreted with some
caution.- 46 -
to industries where incentives to domestic sales exceeded export
incentives. However, the differences in capital intensity among
industries granted different degrees of positive effective incen-
tives to domestic sales are very small. Moreover, the bias of
export promotion towards capital-intensive productions applied to
physical capital intensity only, whereas human capital intensity
was largely the same in industry groups of different protection
levels.
Rank correlation analysis indicates as well that policy induced
discriminations against labour-intensive goods were not strong
enough to be statistically significant, when different industrial
sectors are compared (Table A16) . Relating overall and physical
capital intensity to the adjusted anti-export bias, correlation
coefficients are negative, but insignificant at the 10 percent
level of confidence. Probably, this is partly due to the afore-
mentioned inconsistencies in economic policies. Moreover, Brazi-
lian export promotion schemes, to a large degree, were enter-
prise-specific rather than sector-specific. This refers to the
BEFIEX-scheme, particularly, which provided a specially tailored
System of incentive packages based on long-term export commit-
ments of individual firms. Consequently, policy discriminations
may be significant at the firm-level rather than between indus-
tries, so that a further disaggregated analysis seems to be re-
quired (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 3).
At the global level of total manufacturing, it has been argued
elsewhere (for a summary of major arguments, see Balassa, 1979),
that the policy shift towards stronger world market orientation
after 1964 appeared to be an important element in the improved
economic Performance of Brazil between 1968 and 1973. The reduc-
tion in import protection, introduction of export incentive
schemes, simplification of administrative procedures and the
publicly stated policy of a stable real exchange rate were con-
sidered the major determinants of both high Output and export
growth in this period. After the first oil price shock, trade
policy continued focusing on the expansion of manufactured ex-
ports, but the major thrust of economic policies returned to- 47 -
import Substitution policies. As has been shown before, net in-
centives to exports relative to domestic sales varied remarkably
between different industries, and probably also between different
enterprises or different types of enterprises, so that the policy
impact on exports in the 1970s must be explored at a disaggre-
gated level .
Even in cross-section analysis, i.e. differentiating between in-
dustries, the inconsistencies in incentive policies towards ex-
ports and domestic sales as well as the enterprise-specific ori-
entation of export promotion policies in Brazil seein to have
weakened, though not completely eroded, the policy impact on
export Performance. In the late 1970s, all industries with posi-
tive anti-export bias were characterized by very low export ra-
2 tios, with the exception of chemical products . However, the
relationship between export incentives and export Performance of
manufacturing industries of Brazil is shown to be rather weak
when applying rank correlation analysis (Table 2.7). Although a
positive relationship is revealed between total nominal export
incentives on the one hand and export ratios in 1979 and the
change in export ratios in 1970-79 on the other, Spearman cor-
relation coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level or
better only if a rather narrow definition of manufacturing is
applied, i.e. considering 15 industries out of the 21 industries
The need to assess the net effect of economic policies at a
disaggregated level is also stressed by the development of
import and export ratios (i.e. imports and exports relative to
total domestic production) of various industries (Table A17) .
Notwithstanding that both import and export ratios increased in
most industries from 1963 to 1973, import Substitution con-
tinued in some important industries, mechanical equipment and
transport equipment Standing for the most remarkable cases in
this respect. After 1973, import ratios declined for most of
the industries, whereas export ratios further increased in most
cases. But again there were notable exceptions: wood products,
leather and pharmaceuticals as regards the former; wood pro-
ducts as well as clothing and footwear, in particular, as re-
gards the latter.
2
The increase in the export ratio of chemicals (1970: 5.7 per-
cent; 1979: 11.4 percent) was largely due to the very large
increase in exports of vegetable oils, most of which are clas-
sified under chemicals in the IBGE-classification (World Bank,
1983, p. 84)- 48 -
Table 2.7 - The Relationship between Policy Incentives and Export Performance of





















































































.In parentheses: level of significance of Spearman correlation eoefficients.
For the definition of incentive rates, see Table 2.5.
^Share of exports in total Output of industries.
All 21 industries listed in Table 2.5.
eThe following out of the 21 industries were excluded: non-metallic minerals, metal-
lurgy, processed food, beverages, tobacco and miscellaneous industries. The remaining
list of industries refers to a narrower definition of manufacturing as compared to the
IBGE definition.
On the basis of 12 manufacturing industries for which data on nominal export growth
and incentive rates is roughly comparable, notwithstanding different industrial
classifications in Table AI (SITC) and 2.5 (IBGE); non-metallic mineral products ex-
cluded.
Source: Tables 2.5 and AI; World Bank (1983). - Own calculations.- 49 -
of the IBGE-classification. The impact of net incentives to ex-
ports relative to domestic sales on the degree of world market
orientation of Brazilian industries remains insignificant as
well, though all coefficients show the expected negative signs.
Notwithstanding that a significantly positive relationship be-
tween export incentives and export Performance of Brazilian in-
dustries could not be established by cross-section analysis, the
relevance of net incentives to exports is underlined when looking
at specific industries. This can be exemplified by referring to
transport equipment on the one hand and the electrical equipment
industry on the other. For the former, characterized by the
highest pro-export bias (Table 2.5), the share of exports in
total output jumped from 0.7 percent in 1970 to 10 percent in
1979. The increase in export shares was considerably smaller with
a strong anti-export bias in the case of electrical equipment
(1970: 1.4 percent; 1979: 4.4 percent). In sum, the analysis of
this section suggests a second step of disaggregation, i.e.
looking at major characteristics of enterprises or different
types of enterprises in explaining Brazil's export Performance .
The need for further disaggregation is also evident from the
evidence presented by Tyler (1983). Tyler calculated sectoral
export growth rates in constant US$ terms for the periods 1970-
74 and 1973-77 on the one hand and the changes in the nominal
anti-export bias between 1973 and 1977 on the other, both for
58 Brazilian industries at the 3-digit IBGE sector classifica-
tion. Regression analysis shows that, at this level of disag-
gregation, the inter-industry Variation in the changes in real
export growth rates between the two periods were significantly
related to changes in the anti-export bias. Though accounting
for only 9 percent of the inter-industry variance in the export
growth changes, the regression coefficient is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that for each
percentage point increase in the nominal anti-export bias the
real export growth rate feil by 8.5 percent.- 50 -
CHAPTER 3
EXPORT PERFORMANCE AT THE FIRM LEVEL; MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF
EXPORTING FIRMS AS POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS
3.1. The Relevance of Firm-Specific Analysis
In the cross-section analysis of the preceding paragraphs, it was
implicitly assumed that production patterns are homogeneous with-
in Brazilian industries. However, the discussion of trade related
economic policies of the Brazilian government provided some indi-
cation of intra-industry differences that are likely to influence
the export Performance of Brazilian enterprises. If the direction
and degree of export incentives varies not only between different
industries, but also between different enterprises or different
types of enterprise, the allocation of production factors within
industries is affected by the government as well. At the enter-
prise level, policy measures may discriminate against relatively
small producers, or favour foreign companies vis-ä-vis domestic
enterprises in order to attract foreign investors, for example.
Such biases in economic policies would artificially improve the
international competitiveness of the privileged enterprises, both
relative to other domestic firms and to foreign competitors, and
create different export conditions for various types of enter-
prise within industries which are masked in cross-section ana-
lysis.
In addition to firm-specific policy distortions, the internatio-
nal competitiveness of enterprises may be determined by other
firm characteristics as well. Enterprises within specific in-
dustries may differ with respect to ownership, size and factor
use, for example. This can be supposed as important in explaining
Brazilian export Performance, since such differences are likely
to be related to the degree of world market orientation of firms:
- As regards ownership, the subsidiaries of multinational compa-
nies can be supposed to be the spearheads of export expansion- 51 -
in Brazil. Multinationals located in Brazil will strive for
serving the whole ALADI region and engage in intra-firm trade
with their parent companies in developed countries as well. Due
to strong technological and financial links to their parent
companies, foreign-owned firms in Brazil are likely to have
competitive advantages as compared to national Brazilian firms
and to successfully compete in world markets.
- With respect to firm size, it can be hypothesized that given
considerable fixed costs of entering overseas markets, the
larger the firm the greater is the probability of exporting.
With increasing size, such fixed costs can be spread over a
larger volume of sales. Moreover, to successfully stand the
competition of foreign suppliers in world markets, it may be
crucially important to make use of economies of scale. Presum-
ably, this is most relevant in the case of standardized
product-cycle goods.
- The product cycle hypothesis may be relevant in the context of
enterprise-specific export Performance and the firms
1 factor
use as well. Whereas traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory of
international trade predicts a negative relationship between
capital-intensive production patterns of firms in developing
countries and their export Performance, the product cycle hypo-
thesis suggests comparative advantages of Third World suppliers
operating at relatively high levels of physical capital inten-
sity, if the products manufactured by them are of a standard-
ized nature. Though, in cross-section analysis, this hypothesis
could not explain Brazil's export Performance at the sectoral
level, it may well have some explanatory power at the enter-
prise level.
To subject these hypotheses to an empirical test, comprehensive
firm-specific information on the characteristics of exporting and
non-exporting Brazilian firms is required. Moreover, the competi-
tiveness of Brazilian exporters has to be compared to the most
important competitors of other countries. Only two major recently- 52 -
published studies are known to us which follow a firm-specific
approach to explain Brazilian export Performance. The analysis
presented by Silber (1983) is based on a total number of more
than 19000 firms, about 1200 of which were exporting firms. The
comparison of characteristics between exporting and non-exporting
firms is largely restricted to four major industries (metallurgy,
textiles, transport equipment, food) and data are for 1974 only.
More recent data based on a total number of about 12400 firms
(exporters: 3345) are presented in a study prepared by the ECLAC
office in Brazil (ECLA, 1985). The information given there for
1978 is much broader, in terms of sectoral coverage, the number
of relevant characteristical items analysed and the quality of
data. Thus, the presentation in Sections 3.2. and 3.3. primarily
relies on the latter source. In Section 3.4., major results on
export determinants at the firm level achieved by logit and re-
gression analysis are summarized. Finally, an outline for further
research is drafted by referring to major questions left open'by
previous analyses. It is argued that it is necessary to proceed
on a disaggregated level, i.e. to analyse more closely the dif-
ferences between exporting and non-exporting firms in specific
Brazilian industries. Moreover, further research should concen-
trate on the international competitiveness of Brazilian producers
relative to foreign suppliers, in order to reveal the future
export prospects of Brazilian industries.
3.2. Policy Discrimination against Small Exporters
Notwithstanding that, due to data limitations, the net incentives
granted by the Brazilian government to exports relative to domes-
tic sales (anti-export bias) cannot be calculated for individual
enterprises, some indications exist that economic policies fa-
voured relatively large enterprises. Indirectly, the administra-
tive complexity of protection and incentive Systems created such
a bias, since "smaller firms ... do not have the resources to be
fully informed of the complexities of the system, to process the
applications for incentives and to find their way through the
bureaucratic mechanisms" (World Bank, 1983, p. XII). It is thus- 53 -
not surprising, that one of the main fiscal incentives to ex-
ports, the BEFIEX-scheme, has been used by a small number of
large exporters mainly. About 20 percent of industrial exports
during 1978-80 were performed within BEFIEX, but only 59 enter-
prises maintained BEFIEX-agreements until 1979 (World Bank, 1983,
p. 58)
1.
The relationship between firm size and (fiscal) export subsidies
is further accentuated by available information on 3345 exporting
firms (ECLA, 1985, pp. 26-28). A number of 523 exporters received
no fiscal incentive at all in 1978, i.e. neither income tax re-
ductions nor exports credits. In all industries but one (chemi-
cals), unsubsidized exporters tended to be much smaller than
subsidized exporters (size indicated by average sales). Moreover,
rank correlation analysis reveals highly significant and positive
Spearman coefficients between export volume (as a measure of
average size of exporters) and the rate of export subsidies (re-
lative to export revenues; Table 3.1). For all industries except
non-ferrous metals, it is shown that the smaller the exporter,
the smaller was the export subsidy rate. Thus, it was mainly the
international competitiveness of large enterprises which was
artificially raised by export subsidies granted by the Brazilian
government.
3.3. A Comparison of Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms in the
Manufacturing Industry of Brazil
Biases in export promotion policies can be considered as one
major reason why exporting firms show distinctly different
characteristics as compared to non-exporting enterprises. Another
reason may be that theoretical trade modeis simplify the rather
complex reality, for example by assuming perfect competition,
constant returns to scale and identical production functions for
This number rose to 100 during 1980 and 115 by July 1981.
BEFIEX sectoral programs were largely concentrated on transport
equipment which accounted for nearly half of total export com-
mitments in 1980.- 54 -
Table 3.1 - Spearman Coefficients for Rank Correlations between




































































































Subsidy rates are defined as the ratio of subsidies to subsidy-
inclusive export revenues. Export volume is taken as an indicator
of the size of exporting enterprises.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed
test); **1 percent level.
Source: ECLA (1985, p. 27, Table 7).- 55 -
all firms within specific industries. Actually, various goods are
produced at the sectoral level and most enterprises supply a
whole bündle of products as well. It is conunon use to allocate
each firm to the industry which accounts for the largest pro-
portion of its total sales. Generally, it is not known to which
extent a firm supplies products outside its main industry and,
particularly, to which extent the industrial classification based
on total sales truly reflects the distribution of sales in over-
seas markets. Consequently, homogeneity of firm characteristics
within industries is rather unlikely to persist.
Firm characteristics of exporting enterprises may differ in vari-
ous respects from non-exporting firms. Available firm-specific
information for Brazilian enterprises allows comparisons with
respect to firm size, ownership and factor absorption (ECLA,
1985; Silber, 1983). As regards firm size, it has been hypothe-
sized that given considerable fixed costs of entering overseas
markets, the larger the firm the greater is the probability of
exporting, since fixed costs can be spread over a larger volume
of total sales (for the case of Brazil, see also Tyler, 1976, pp.
254-260). Actually, the percentage of Brazilian firms which ex-
ported in 1978 increased with larger size. Allocating sample
firms to different size classes, the percentage of exporters
amounted to less than 1 percent in the smallest size class, 4 -
26 percent in the middle ränge and 62 percent in the top group of
enterprises with more than Cruzeiro 100 million in total sales
(Table 3.2). The clear tendency of larger size increasing the
probability that a firm will export is present in each of the 21
industries.
However, once the decision to export has been taken, large firms
tended to export a smaller proportion of their total sales than
relatively small firms. In 19 out of 21 industries listed in
Table 3.3, Spearman coefficients for correlations between the
amount of domestic sales of Brazilian exporting firms and export
ratios are negative, 10 of which are significant at the 5 percent
level or better. This pattern may be explained as follows: A- 56 -
Table 3.2 - Percentage of Exporting Firms by Size and Industries , 1978
Total
Non-metallic minerals














































































































































































































Size classes are defined as follows:
I Less than 2 million Cruzeiros in sales;
II 2-4 million Cruzeiros;
III 4-8 million Cruzeiros;
IV 8-12 million Cruzeiros;
V 12-25 million Cruzeiros;
VI 25-50 million Cruzeiros;
VII 50-100 million Cruzeiros;
VIII More than 100 million Cruzeiros.
Source; ECIA (1985, p. 23, Table 4).- 57 -
Table 3.3 - Spearman Coefficients for Rank Correlations between
Firm Size and Export Performance , 1978
Total
Non-metallic minerals













































Rank correlation is based on a total number of 3345 Brazilian
exporters. Firm size measured by domestic sales, export perform-
ance by export ratios, i.e. exports relative to total sales.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level; **1 percent
level.
Source: ECLA (1985, p. 25, Table 6)
minimum size may be required to become competitive in internatio-
nal markets at all; but once a firm has decided to export and has
incurred the fixed costs of entering overseas markets, exporters
operating in relatively narrow domestic markets have the most to
gain from exports as regards cost reductions by making use of
scale economies (see also Glejser et al., 1980; Teitel, Thoumi,
1986) .
Within the group of large enterprises operating in Brazil, the
subsidiaries of multinational corporations figured prominently.
Multinational were concentrated in the most modern and dynamic
manufacturing industries, like mechanical and electrical equip-
ment, transport equipment, plastics and pharmaceuticals (Table
A18). Thus, multinationals can be expected to be the spearheads
of Brazilian exports as well.- 58 -
Actually, the subsidiaries of foreign enterprises accounted for
about 40 percent of total Brazilian industrial exports in 1967
and almost total exports of electrical equipment, transport
equipment, plastics and pharmaceuticals. In 1978, the share of
multinationals in total manufactured exportfs of Brazil again
amounted to almost 40 percent, notwithstanding some changes in
various industries (Table A19). The export share of foreign-owned
firms exceeded their share in total domestic sales of manufactur-
ing industries (33 percent) by 6 percentage points. In all but
seven of the 21 industries, export participation of multinatio-
nals was higher than participation in domestic sales.
There is some tendency that multinationals received stronger
export incentives than national firms in Brazil. Nearly half of
subsidized export credits were granted to foreign-owned firms (as
compared to an export share of 39 percent), whereas their share
in export subsidies provided by income tax exemption was slightly
below their export share. However, the former result may be
largely due to the aforementioned bias in export promotion poli-
cies towards larger enterprises rather than outright Privileges
granted to multinationals.
In most Brazilian industries, foreign-owned enterprises accounted
for a considerably larger share in value added than in employment
(total manufacturing: 36 percent and 26 percent, respectively).
The tendency towards relatively capital-intensive production by
multinationals in Brazil is probably due to various reasons. The
bias in Brazilian export promotion in favour of large enterprises
and capital-intensive industries may be of some relevance. How-
ever, large enterprises (most of the Brazilian subsidiaries of
multinationals belonged to this category) are generally known to
use rather capital- and skill-intensive techniques compared to
smaller firms. Moreover, multinationals figured most prominently
in rather capital-intensive industries, like electrical equip-
ment, transport equipment and rubber products (Tables AI 8 and
2.2). Due to strong ties to their parent companies in developed
economies, the relatively poor endowment of Brazil as regards
human skills and, though to a lesser extent, physical capital did- 59 -
not constrain the multinationals
1 choice of production techniques
as much as it might have done for national producers.
Permanent inflows of technical know-how and physical capital
associated with the operations of multinationals in Brazil may
have induced more capital-intensive exports. Most interestingly,
in 1974 the share of exports to LAFTA (which can be considered as
relatively capital-intensive) in total exports was more than
twice as high for multinationals than for domestic firms (Silber,
1983, p. 91). But also the capital intensity of exports by
national firms was likely to be positively affected by the multi-
nationals
1 operations in Brazil. Probably, domestic producers
made use of the know-how embodied in products supplied by
foreign-owned enterprises.
The comparison of factor intensities between exporting and non-
exporting Brazilian enterprises in Table 3.4 is based on the
Lary-concept (for an explanation, see Section 2.2). Estimates of
overall, physical and human capital intensities are presented,
measured by value added per employee, non-wage value added per
employee and wages per employee, respectively. Exporters clearly
applied more capital-intensive techniques than non-exporters.
With only one exception (footwear), both physical and human capi-
tal intensity were higher for exporting enterprises. However, it
cannot be concluded that higher capital intensity necessarily had
a positive impact on the probability of exporting: "Firms that
export may be relatively capital-intensive not by virtue of the
fact that they seil part of their Output to foreign markets, but
rather because they are large" (ECLA, 1985, pp. 31-32). The cor-
relation coefficient between size and overall capital intensity
is significantly positive (0.46).
Differences in capital intensity between exporting and non-ex-
porting firms are in effect considerably narrowed if comparisons
are normalized by size. This can be done on the basis of data on
electricity consumption and average wages in four Brazilian in-
dustries presented by Silber (1983, Tables 14, 16 and the statis-Table 3.4 - Capital Intensity of Exporting and Non-Exporting Brazilian Firms by Industry, 1978 (thousands of Cruzeiros)
Value added Non-wage Wages per
per employee value added employee
per employee
Value added Non-^wage Wages per






















































































































































































































value added per employee, non-wage value added per employee and wages per employee indicate Overall, physical and human capital
intensity, respectively. Calculated as means on the basis of data for a total number of about 12 400 sample firms; transformed
fron natural logarithms presented in the source. It may be due to both factors that figures for non-wage value added per employee
plus wages per employee do not add up to total value added per employee.
Source; ECLA. (1985, pp. 77-78, Table C-l).- 61 -
tical appendix to Chapter 4) . According to Table 3.5, exporting
sample firms, on average, consumed about twice as much electrici-
ty per employee and paid considerably higher wages than non-ex-
porting firms . However, the picture changes drastically when
exporters and non-exporters of similar size are compared. For the
four selected manufacturing industries as a whole, the differen-
ces in both measures are significantly reduced. Exporters in
transport equipment industries consumed less rather than more
electricity than non-exporters, when the comparison is normalized
by size. Wage differentials in this industry drop from 89 percent
to less than 20 percent in the most important size classes. In
textiles, the reduction in wage differentials is somewhat smal-
ler; figures on electricity consumption in the three lower size
groups (which include more than 75 percent of both textile expor-
ters and non-exporters) indicate that physical capital intensity
was only marginally higher or even lower (101-200 employees) for
exporters.
3.4. Major Determinants of Export Performance at the Firm Level:
A Summary of Previous Research and Open Questions
The results presented above confirm that an isolated comparison
of capital intensity in exporting and non-exporting enterprises
is misleading. To determine the independent effect of capital
intensity and other variables on the probability of exporting and
on export Performance requires a multivariate approach. As re-
gards the probability of exporting, logit analysis has been ap-
plied where Y. is a dichotomous variable (which takes the value
of 1 if firm i exports and 0 if it does not) and P. Stands for
the estimated probabilities (0-1 intervall; for a detailed pre-
In contrast to the Lary-measures presented above, Silber con-
siders consumption of electricity per employee as an indicator
of physical capital intensity and average wages paid as an
indicator of human capital intensity.
2
The figures must be interpreted with some caution, however,
since the way of calculation remains somewhat dubious in the
source; see footnote to Table 3.5 as well.- 62 -
Table 3.5 - Comparison of Exporting and Non-Exporting Brazilian Firms as regards Electricity Consumption















































































































































































































Consumption of electricity per employee as an indicator of physical capital intensity; average
wages paid as an indicator of human capital intensity. In parentheses: number of firms in the re-
spective category. The way of calculating the measures for the total number of firms on the one hand
and different size classes on the other is not explained in the source. Thus, it is not completely
clear why figures for the totals differ considerably from both weighted and unweighted averages for
the size classes.
Size classes according to the number of employees.
cMetallurgy, textiles, transport equipment and food, with a total number of 19181 firms of which
1226 were exporters.
Source; Silber (1983, Tables 14, 16 and the statistical appendix to Chapter 4).- 63 -
sentation, see ECLA, 1985, Chapter IV)











bc LIC. b l
In In fc>3 ADV± STATEi
bc FoR. b l
firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of
sales;
capital intensity, defined as the natural logarithm
of value added per employee; K is split into HK and
PHK, i.e. human and physical capital intensity,
measured according to the Lary-concept;
ratio of advertising expenditures to domestic sales;
dummy variable, which takes the value of unity if
the government holds equity in the firm, and zero
otherwise;
dummy variable, which is equal to one if a national
Brazilian firm has a licensing agreement with a
foreign firm, and zero otherwise;
dummy variable, which is equal to one if foreigners
hold more than 10 percent of the equity of a firm,
and zero otherwise.
Estimation of the logit model for all sample firms reveals the
following regression coefficients, all of which except STATE are
significant at the 1 percent level of confidence (STATE: 5 per-
cent level; for industry -specific results, see Table A20):
In industry-specif ic estimates, LIC and FoR are combined to
LICFoR, and STATE is deleted due to an insufficient number of
public enterprises in the sample (Table A20).- 64 -
(1) Z = -12.6 + 0.90 In S - 0.35 In K + 5.2 ADV - 1.4 STATE
+0.58 LIC +0.94 FoR
(2) Z = -13.5 + 0.88 In S - 0.19 In HK - 0.09 In PHK + 5.0
ADV - 1.4 STATE +0.58 LIC +0.93 FoR
The most interesting findings are the following:
- The coefficient of the size variable (In S) is positive. A 10
percent increase in firm size was associated with a 9 percent
increase in the odds of exporting. In all industry-specific
regressions, the size variable is significantly positive as
well.
- The coefficient of In K, i.e. overall capital intensity is
negative as suggested by Standard theory of international
trade. The probability of exporting increased for enterprises
applying rather labour-intensive techniques. This result holds
for 19 out of 21 industry-specif ic regressions as well, but
only 9 coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level.
Both physical and human capital intensity were negatively re-
lated to the probability of exporting. However, the consider-
ably larger value of the coefficient of HK indicates that vari-
ations in human capital intensity had a much greater impact on
the probability of exporting than did variations in physical
capital intensity. This provides some support to the product
cycle hypothesis.
- Public enterprises were less likely to export than privately
owned firms, as indicated by the negative coefficient of STATE.
In contrast, foreign participation both in the form of direct
investment and licensing increased the probability of export-
ing. This is in line with expectations that multinationals
operating in Brazil were the spearheads of exporting.
In a second step, regression analysis has been applied in order
to address the question as to what determined the allocation of
Output between domestic and overseas sales, once the decision to- 65 -
export has been taken . Export Performance is measured by the
ratio of exports to domestic sales. Major results can be sum-
marized as follows:
- In accordance with rank correlations presented in Table 3.3,
regression analysis shows tfiat large firms in terms of domestic
sales tended to export a relatively small proportion of their
Output.
- In contrast to results for the probability to export at all,
export ratios increased with higher (overall) capital intensi-
ty. However, the significance of the coefficient of In K is
solely attributable to variations in physical capital, whereas
the human capital variable is not significantly different from
2
zero . The positive impact of physical capital intensity on
export ratios may be explained as follows: "A firm with a large
investment in plant and equipment requires a larger volume of
exports to reduce average costs to a minimum than does a firm
with the same volume of domestic sales but less capital-inten-
sive production techniques" (ECLA, 1985, p. 46).
- Economic policy variables generally show the expected signs:
Higher implicit tariff protection was associated with lower
export ratios. The presence of export subsidies improved export
Performance, although the results are somewhat ambiguous as
regards variations in subsidy rates granted by the export tax
credit scheme. The drawback scheine which provided for duty-free
imports was most valuable for exporters relying heavily on
foreign suppliers of inputs. This may explain why export per-
Thus, in contrast to logit analysis, the regressions are based
on data for exporting firms (3345) exclusively. In addition to
the independent variables considered in logit analysis, some
additional variables entered regression analysis; for details,
see ECLA (1985, Chapter V).
o
In contrast, Silber (1983, pp. 104-106) found the skill factor
to be significantly positive and physical capital intensity
positive but insignificant. However, the Lary-measure applied
by ECLA is clearly superior to consumption of electricity which
was taken by Silber as a measure of physical capital intensity.- 66 -
formance was found to be relatively poor for more vertically
integrated Brazilian firms. The latter result may also indicate
an important bottleneck to future export growth of Brazilian
enterprises. If Brazilian exporters are required to buy most of
their inputs from national sources and if domestic suppliers
are less efficient in terms of product prices and product
quality as compared to world markets, the international com-
petitiveness of Brazilian exporters is likely to be negatively
affected.
- As concerns ownership characteristics, foreign participation in
the form of both direct investment and licensing had a positive
impact on export Performance . The same was true for State
ownership; the latter result may be rather arbitrary, however,
since only eight sample exporters were public enterprises.
The results presented in the preceding paragraphs underline the
relevance of a fairly disaggregated analysis in order to identify
the major determinants of Brazilian export Performance in the
past and to evaluate the future export prospects of this country.
The question of relative efficiency of different types of enter-
prise and the relevance of scale economies in achieving competi-
tiveness in world markets can be accurately dealt with in the
context of in-depth studies on specific industries only. It would
be most important to obtain cost data for the firms and to com-
pare them internationally in order to carefully assess their
future export prospects. This would also help to answer the
question about the export strength of industries that are given
priority by the Brazilian government, once Privileges are phased
out.
Until then, one has to rely on indirect evidence. For example,
direct price comparisons indicate that the Brazilian automobile
industry has become increasingly efficient as it expanded (World
This result conflicts with the finding of Silber (1983, pp.
104-106) who concluded that export ratios were scaled down by
the presence of multinationals.- 67 -
Bank, 1983, pp. 116-125). In the early 1980s, the prices of Bra-
zilian vehicles were considerably below those of similar foreign
vehicles. To some extent, this may be traced to lower prices for
iron and steel inputs, compared to international Standards. More-
over, car prices in Brazil feil relative to the general Brazilian
price index, and some evidence suggests that this decline was
closely linked with economies of scale. On the other side, how-
ever, some material costs have been considerably higher than in
the competing countries and automobile prices are controlled by
the government. Thus, whether the automobile industry is likely
to be found at the forefront of Brazilian manufactured exports in
the future as well can only be judged on the background of a more
detailed sector study.
The automobile industry Stands for an interesting example of
technological development based on foreign companies as well. It
has been shown that subsidiaries of multinational corporätions in
Brazil played a major role in exporting manufactured goods. Prob-
ably, this cannot be attributed to greater export incentives
granted to them and economies of scale due to size alone. Inter-
national competitiveness might have been improved by greater cost
efficiency among the local suppliers of parts and components.
Foreign automobile producers successfully developed their local
suppliers by providing finance, training and technical assist-
ance. In this way, technological development in backward indus-
tries was stimulated by the operations of foreign enterprises.
Consequently, favourable export prospects are likely to exist in
industries with direct foreign participation and in sectors that
indirectly derive benefit from foreign enterprises
1 operations,
provided that the Brazilian government will continue to welcome
technology transfers via foreign direct investment in the future.
Because of considerable differences between Brazilian industries,
both in terms of export Performance and economic incentives,
further research should be concentrated on specific industries
and their position in the international division of labour. Meas-
ures have to be applied which indicate the net policy effects on
exports. Net effective incentive rates to exports and domestic- 68 -
sales would be best suited in this respect, insofar as they em-
brace the effects of both import protection and export promotion
and consider exchange rate effects as well. This would help to
clarify the discussion on the effectiveness of economic incen-
tives in Brazil, which is characterized by alternative hypothe-
ses. On the one hand, it is argued that a reduction in the anti-
export bias would induce Brazilian industries to operate at ef-
ficiency levels closer to international Standards (see, for exara-
ple, Tyler, 1983). On the other hand, the view has been expressed
that Brazilian industries have achieved a high degree of competi-
tiveness in spite of anti-export biases in economic policies
(see, for example, Teitel, Thoumi, 1986). It is stressed that the
Performance of manufacturing during the 1970s showed increasing
competitiveness and efficiency with respect to international
Standards as well as high Output and export growth, notwith-
standing that the average level of protection of domestic sales
and incentives to exports were moderate for the manufacturing
sector as a whole (World Bank, 1983, p. 87). As regards consumer
goods industries, the World Bank concluded (p. 77): "With a very
large domestic market, fast growing domestic demand, increasing
exports, and generally small minimum efficient size plants, the
lack of foreign competition resulting from high tariff and non-
tariff barriers was apparently compensated by a considerable
degree of domestic competition".
However, the question of improved international competitiveness
as a result of larger production runs enabled by fast growing
domestic markets and/or policy incentives to exports should be
addressed at a more disaggregated level. This is because economic
incentive rates varied drastically between industries as well as
between different types of enterprise, and future export pros-
pects of Brazilian industries cannot be accurately assessed with-
out comparing the structure of production costs of Brazil rela-
tive to its major competitors in the world economy.- 69 -
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Notwithstanding that Brazil's export Performance until the mid-
1980s was most impressive, both in terms of absolute growth and
relative to other world market suppliers, considerable room for
further export expansion, in particular with respect to raanu-
factured exports, still exists. First, the potential for further
export market diversification does not seem to be exhausted as
suggested by the continuous dominance of US and ALADI markets.
Second, there is still plenty of room for further product dif-
ferentiation: Out of the fifteen most important export items in
1981, ten still belonged to the non-manufactures category ac-
counting for nearly half of total Brazilian exports. Third, the
export ratio of most manufacturing industries continued to be
considerably below 10 percent in the early 1980s. Finally, the
absolute volume of Brazilian manufactured exports was not such
that further export expansion faces serious external constraints;
the Brazilian share in world exports was still rather small.
Brazil can still be supposed to be relatively well equipped with
(unskilled) labour, whereas capital Stands for the relatively
scarce production factor, especially in the form of human capi-
tal. Hence, the country's comparative advantages in the inter-
national division of labour are concentrated on relatively la-
bour-intensive products in the first place. As actual export
Performance shows, labour-intensive exports continued to account
for a significant share in Brazilian sales to developed country
markets. However, more capital-intensive products dominated ex-
ports to the ALADI region, particularly, and gained significantly
in importance in exports to developed countries in the more
recent past.
As regards ALADI, the Brazilian export pattern of the 1970s was
influenced by attempts to continue import Substitution policies
at the regional level. Capital-intensive supplies to the Latin
American market by the most advanced ALADI-members like Brazil
were favoured by discriminations against imports from outside
ALADI. In the meanwhile, the regional approach towards free trade- 70 -
has been largely abandoned and replaced by a great number of bi-
lateral trading arrangements. Trade conditions within the ALADI
region may thus be complicated in the 1980s. Although it is to be
expected that Brazil's exports to neighbouring Latin American
countries will remain rather capital-intensive, major adjustments
may be required at the sectoral level. For example, Brazilian
supplies of machinery and transport equipment will be negatively
affected if other ALADI-members insist on greater shares in the
production of such industries. This issue is most important as
concerns Brazil's export prospects; it has to be dealt with in
more detail in industry-specific studies.
The rising share of more capital-intensive products in Brazilian
exports to developed countries can be attributed to different
factors. First of all, the product cycle hypothesis may apply,
according to which developing countries have comparative advan-
tages in producing standardized goods, which may be capital-
intensive in terms of physical capital but do not require consid-
erable inputs of highly skilled labour (human capital). Especial-
ly in the case of Brazil, constraints in the availability of
physical capital were not very strong until the early 1980s: the
country could easily approach international capital markets and
was given priority by multinational corporations as regards
foreign direct investment.
Notwithstanding the impressive export Performance in sectors like
transport equipment, there is some evidence for the 1970s that
Brazil has not yet made use of its comparative advantage in sup-
plying standardized product-cycle goods as significantly as might
be expected. Generally, Brazilian industries of relatively high
physical capital intensity were characterized by relatively high
skill intensity as well. The position of machinery and transport
equipment in human skill requirements (relative to total manu-
facturing) was even more unfavourable than with respect to over-
all capital intensity, for example. Moreover, the negative rela-
tionship between capital intensity and export Performance of
Brazilian industries turned out to be slightly weaker, rather
than stronger for human capital as compared to physical capital.- 71 -
However, when economic policies in Brazil could be supposed to be
largely in line with the country's comparative advantage (i.e. in
the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s) , the improvement in
export Performance was most striking in industries with rather
low skill requirements. This result may be taken as an indication
of the future potential of standardized exports of Brazil, pro-
vided that economic policies would help this process and persis-
ting problems in servicing foreign debt will not result in seri-
ous constraints in attracting further financial inflows from
abroad.
Economic policy incentives stand for the second possible reason
responsible for the increasing share of capital-intensive Brazi-
lian exports to developed countries. Export subsidies were found
to be positively related to Brazil's export Performance in the US
and other developed economies. Brazilian trade policies seem to
be somewhat biased towards rather capital-intensive industries,
notwithstanding the inconsistencies in incentive policies towards
exports and domestic sales that are likely to have weakened the
policy impact on exports. In contrast to the traditionally cas-
cading structure of protection in developing countries, in Brazil
the highest levels of protection were granted to capital goods
industries and the lowest levels to consumer goods industries in
1980.
The favourable treatment of sectors like transport equipment may
be justified on the basis of infant industry arguments. It has
clearly helped the priority sectors to expand their overseas
sales. However, Brazil's trade policies give rise to several
problems as well, especially as concerns the country's future
prospects in exporting:
- Economic policies discriminating against traditional export
items may negatively affect future export Performance in one of
Brazil's principal export domains, i.e. relatively labour-in-
tensive products. Probably, the traditional sectors to a great
extent have to bear the considerable fiscal costs arising from
high levels of nominal incentives granted to priority sectors.- 72 -
- The wide dispersion of economic incentives between industries
and the considerable complexity of the incentive schemes are
likely to result in unintended side-effects which may hamper
further export expansion in the future. The World Bank (1983,
p. 89) concludes that the enormous dispersion of protection and
export incentive rates "is bound to generate misallocation of
resources, to maintain pockets of inefficiency within the in-
dustrial sector and, in the medium and long run, to constrain
industrial growth".
- It is open to question whether priority sectors are prepared to
compete successfully in World markets, if Privileges granted to
them are reduced when they can no longer be considered infant
industries.
As regards the two first-mentioned issues, it is most noteworthy
that firm-specific data pointed to policy discriminations at the
firm level as well, especially with respect to firm size. Export
subsidy rates granted by the Brazilian government increased with
the size of the exporting firms. Probably, this policy bias has
further reduced the probability of exporting in the case of rela-
tively small enterprises. However, once the decision to export
has been taken, firm size was negatively related to export per-
formance. Alternative explanations may apply, the validity of
which must be explored by more detailed analyses at the sectoral
level. It may be argued that smaller firms operating in rather
narrow domestic markets show better export Performance because
selling to overseas markets provides the only way to them to make
use of scale economies. This would imply that exporting is con-
sidered a "second-best solution" to achieve cost reductions by
increasing the scale of production. Consequently, future export
expansion of Brazil may slow down in industries where promising
prospects in the development of domestic demand allow Brazilian
suppliers to operate at optimal levels of production. Actually,
the volume of Brazilian exports was negatively related to the
degree of capacity utilization by domestic sales. Alternatively,
the favourable export Performance of smaller enterprises may be
attributed to higher efficiency and higher flexibility in re-- 73 -
sponding to changes in world demand. In this case, the policy
bias against small firms poses a seriöus threat to further export
expansion of Brazil, since it may deeply erode the export poten-
tial based on the relative strengths of small enterprises.
The results presented underline the relevance of a fairly disag-
gregated analysis in order to identify the major determinants of
Brazilian export Performance in the past and to evaluate the
future export prospects of the country. Especially as regards the
Brazilian export prospects, some crucial questions are left open
by previous analyses so that further research activities should
be devoted to this issue. Most importantly, a closer look at the
structure of production costs of Brazilian exporters relative to
major competitors in the world economy is urgently needed, in
order to be able to assess the international competitiveness of
Brazilian enterprises vis-ä-vis foreign suppliers. In determining
the relative competitive position of Brazilian firms in world
markets, it is also necessary to identify possible internal and
external bottlenecks to continuous export growth.
- As concerns internal factors that may hamper export growth, the
question of an efficient domestic supply of inputs has to be
addressed. Furthermore, recent changes in economic policies, as
the so-called 'Plan Cruzado
1 (Fischer, 1986), must be evaluated
with respect to the consequences they may have for Brazil's
export prospects.
- As concerns possible external bottlenecks, the analysis of
supply factors in Brazil has to be supplemented by a tentative
assessment of major developments in world markets. The inter-
national demand for Brazil's exports critically hinges on
changes in the demand conditions in the country's principal
overseas markets. It has been shown that it is crucially im-
portant to differentiate between Brazil's major export markets,
because of completely different export conditions. As regards
ALADI markets, for example, it is striking that multinational
corporations located in Brazil devoted a considerably larger
share of total exports tb ALADI-members in the mid-1970s than- 74 -
did national enterprises. Probably, the export products of
multinationals enjoyed relatively high trade preferences in the
Latin American market. However, ALADI has become a rather loose
association, and bilateral trading arrangements between ALADI-
members have replaced the regional approach towards freer trade
to a significant extent. This is likely to affect the level of
protection vis-ä-vis suppliers from outside the ALADI region
and, consequently, the destination and commodity structure of
Brazilian exports.
Continued high growth in manufactured exports seems to be the
prerequisite of sustainable economic development of Brazil in the
1980s. This may be difficult to achieve under the policy frame-
work that prevailed during most of the 1970s (see also World
Bank, 1983, pp. 87-93). Most importantly, exchange rate policy
must be flexible enough to avoid overvaluation, the dispersion in
incentive rates among industries should be reduced, incentive
schemes have to be simplified and applied less discriminatory to
smaller firms, and the access to imported inputs and technology
for export production should be improved in order to reduce con-
siderable anti-export biases in many industries. Provided that
economic policies encourage industrial development in line with
Brazil's comparative advantages, the expansion of Brazilian manu-
factured exports is most likely to continue.- 75 -
ANNEX I
Export Expansion and Economic Growth; The Brazilian Casey
1969-1984
Various studies have been carried out to determine the role of
exports for economic growth in developing countries [e.g., see
Balassa (1978), Michaely (1977), Krueger (1978), Tyler (1981a),
Kavoussi (1984)]. Most of them have used a cross-country sample
and confirmed a positive and strong association between export
Performance and GNP growth. Our purpose here is to examine
whether this was also true for Brazil for the period 1969-84.
Our theoretical approach is similar to Ram (1985), i.e. the ag-
gregate production function was defined as follows:
(1) Y = f(L, K, X)
where:
Y = aggregate real Output
L = labour input
K = capital input
X = exports.
Ram treats exports as an input in the production function. This
specification is fairly Standard and common in the literature.
The equation finally estimated has the following form:
(2) Y = aQ + ax L + a2 | + a3 X
The variables are expressed in rates of growth. Since the rate of
growth of capital input (K) was not known, the investment-income
ratio (I/Y) , as suggested by Ram, is used as a proxy. Equation
(2) is estimated using annual data for the period 1969-84. Until
1981 the data is only taken from World Bank, World Tables and
thereafter from IMF, International Financial Statistics. Two dif-- 76 -
ferent dependent variables are used: total Output growth (Y), and
total manufactured Output growth (MI). Therefore, we also use two
measures of exports: total and manufactured exports.
Table A.I.l shows the econometric results of equation (2) for
different definitions of the dependent variable:
- In case of MI, labour force growth proved to be statistically
insignificant. In all the equations, the manufactured export
growth variable shows large and statistically significant cop.f-
ficients. The investment variable is statistically significant
as well.
- In case of Y, the results differ from above. While the invest-
ment variable is statistically significant in practically all
regression equations, the same is not true for the export vari-
able. Only when the latter is defined as manufactured export
growth, it becomes important, otherwise it turned out to be
insignificant.
In sum, we can conclude that manufactured exports and investment
had both a positive and significant impact on industrial output
growth. However, the investment variable (I/Y) was more relevant
when the dependent variable was total output growth. The fact
that manufactured exports were statistically significant for
total output emphasizes that export growth may have a dynamic and
multiplier effect in the economy as a whole, independently of
their origin. Therefore, export expansion has had a positive and
significant impact in Brazil, particularly in the industrial
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L = average annual rate of growth of the labour foroe (percent).
I = total gross domestic investment in nominal terms.
Y = total Output (GDP) in nominal terms.
XM = average annual rate of growth of manufactured exports in
CT = average annual rate of growth of total
Y = average annual rate of growth of total
real terms (prarcent)
exports in real terms (percent).

















^irst order serial correlation of the error maximum likelihood iterative technique was used
in parentheses - Tlumber of iterations needed to achieve convergence of Pho is shown betwaen






























































Real Exchange Rates and Export Growth in Brazil
The exchange rate and export subsidies are generally considered
to be important policy instruments in determining export
Performance. A positive relationship is to be expected between
export growth on the one hand and a depreciating real exchange
rate and rising export subsidies on the other, other things being
equal. This is so because changes in the exchange rate and export
subsidies bring about changes in domestic relative prices between
tradeable and non-tradeable goods.
Different measures of policy induced competitiveness were
calculated as follows:
R *
E1 = WP /WP1
R *







B . E, (l+s)/WP
B]
where:
WP = Brazilian wholesale price index (item 63 in IMF, In-
ternational Financial Statistics (IFS);
US WP = US wholesale price index (item 63 IFS);
*
WP.. = moving weighted average of wholesale price indices of
.1 nine countries ;
s = export subsidies;
E.. = moving weighted average of exchange rate indices be-
1 tween Brazil and nine countries (item rf in IFS) ;
The weight of the year 1967 was used in the 1962-69 period;
1970 in 1970-74; 1975 in 1975-78; 1979 in 1979-81; and 1982 in
1982-84.- 79 -
WP, = moving weighted average of wholesale price indices for
the main twelve trading partners ;
Eo = moving weighted average of exchange rate indices be-
1 tween Brazil and twelve countries ;
E_ = exchange rate index between the Cruzeiro and the US$
(item rf in IFS);
P = Brazilian manufactured export price index in US$ (Getü-
lio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura Econömica);
PRS = profitability of exports.
The first three raeasures represent a real exchange rate concept
as approximated by the purchasing power parity. The weights for
*
WP.. and E1 correspond to the share in world manufactured exports
of the US, Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, West Germany, the UK,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan. These countries were con-
sidered the main competitors of Brazil. These (partial) multi-
lateral trade weights are usually used to capture export competi-
2 *
tion in third markets . On the other hand, the weights for WP_
and E» correspond to the share of the US, Argentina, Colombia,
Mexico, Paraguay, Chile, West Germany, the ÜK, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Japan, and Venezuela in total Brazilian manufactured ex-
ports. The last measure (PRS) determines the profitability of
exports vis-ä-vis the domestic market and is generally known as
the real US$ exchange rate for exporters. An increase in export
subsidies, a devaluation or a rise in the foreign price of Bra-
zilian exports encourage local producers to seil abroad rather
than in the domestic market, other things being equal.
The weight of the year 1962 was used in the period 1962-66;
1967 in 1967-69; 1970 in 1970-74; 1975 in 1975-78; 1979 in
1979-81; and 1982 in 1982-84.
2
See Gutierrez-Camara, Huß (1983) .- 80 -
Tables A.II.l and A.II.2 present results for E.,, E_ and E^ as
well as PRS. For reasons of comparison, indices calculated in
previous studies are added. All three measures of real exchange
rates show a depreciation in the period of rapid export growth
(1968-73), which amounted to an annual average of 2.1 percent
(E.) , 8.3 percent (E-) and 0.4 percent (E~) , respectively. The
annual average depreciation slowed down considerably in 1974-78.
However, sluggish world demand rather than the exchange rate must
be considered the main reason of the relatively unfavourable
export growth during the period between the two oil price shocks.
After the maxi-devaluation of 1979, any of the three real ex-
change rate measures experienced a decline, i.e. real apprecia-
tion: in 1981, they were below the base year. In the last sub-
period considered (i.e. 1982-84) , all the indices indicate an
improvement in Brazil's competitiveness until 1983, when another
maxi-devaluation took place. As regards the real US$ exchange
rate for exporters or profitability of exports (PRS), Table
A.II.2 shows an improvement of 9.3 percent per annum on average
in 1963-74. After the first oil price shock and until 1984,
profitability experienced an average annual decline of 1.2 per-
cent.
Figure A.II.l depicts the indices of real exchange rates E_ and
E., and prof itability of manufactured exports on the one hand and
Brazilian manufactured exports to the world, the US, and ALADI on
the other. As regards PRS, a positive relationship to export
growth is evident at least until 1974. Generally, however, the
relationship between real exchange rates and export growth is
obscured, probably mainly due to demand factors. Especially after
1973, the fluctuations in world demand increased considerably
compared to the relatively stable demand conditions in the 1960s
and early 1970s, so that demand factors dominated the impact of

















































































































































































































































^or the definition of E.., E„ and E~, see the text; above 100 = real depreciation; below 100 = real appreciation.
bCardoso (1982, Table 6.A); 1975 = 100.
cDippl (1986, Table 7, p. 17 (column 5)); index recalculated based on 1975 = 100.
Source: Own calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics; Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim; Cardoso















































































































































































































































































































For the definition of variables, see the text.
1982 until 1984, an annual increase in subsidies of 5.2 percent was assumed, which was equal to the increase from
1980 to 1981. Subsidy rates were taken from Cardoso (1980) and Horta (1983).
US Ix
Real US$ exchange rate for exporters (DW) was calculated by Cardoso (1982) as follows: DW =
where Ix is the rate of Cruzeiros received for one US$ of exported goods (including subsidies). P
CHorta (1983, Table 10, p. 532); index recalculated with base 1975 = 100.




Source: Own calculations based on IMF, International Financial Statistics; Getülio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura
Economica; Cardoso (1980; 1982); Horta (1983); Dippl (1986).- 83 -
Figure A.II. 1
Indices of Real Exchange Rates, Profitability of Exports and

















i r 1 r
1963 1965 1970
Source: Own calculations based on UN, Coitunodity Trade Statistics;
IMF, International Financial Statistics.Table AI - Brazil's Nominal Export Growth in Different SITC-Categories , 1963-81 (percent)





































































Annual averages. Real growth rates for individual SITC-categories could not be calculated since Information
on adequate price deflators was not available.
Source: UN, Conunodity Trade Statistics; own calculations.- 85 -
Table A2 - Classificatign of Brazilian Industries According to Capital Investment
per Employee , 1960-79












































































Reading fron top down, the industries are becoming less capital-intensive.
Source: Own calculations based on IBGE, Anuario Estatistico do Brasil.- 86 -
Table A3 - Manufactured Export Structure of Different Regions and Brazil,
1965-81 (percent of total manufactured exports of each region)
















































































Source: Own calculations based on UNCTAD, Handbook of International
Trade and Development Statistics.- 87 -
Table A4 - Regional Distribution of Brazilian Manufactured Ex-














































































































































































Includes developing Africa, Asia, and Oceania, Malta, Spain,
Yugoslavia, Caribbean, and rest of developing America.
Source; Own calculations based on UN, Commodity Trade Statistics,- 88 -
Table A5 - Gini Coefficients of Brazilian Manufactured Export Concentration in Dif-






























































aThe Gini coefficient was calculated as follows:
n 'W
j = 1 ... 26 (SITC at 2-digit level)
i = 1 ... 6 (export inarkets)
where
X. . = exports of industrial sector 'j' to market 'i'.
X. = total manufactured exports to market 'i'. im
D Argentina, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.
Percentage change of the Gini coefficient in the period.
Source: Own calculations based on UN, Commodity Trade Statistics.- 89 -
Table A6 - Structure of Brazilian Manufactured Exports at 2-Digit SITC-Level, 1962-81













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Cwn calculations based on UN, Commodity Trade Statistics.- 92 -






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a ECA calculated as:





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Classification of countries according to UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics,
1984. NICs include: Argentina, Höng Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan.
Source: Om calculations based on UN, Ccmnodity Trade Statistics.Table A8 - Brazil: A Comparison of Different Indices of Revealed Comparative Advantage for Manufacturing Industries at 4-Digit SITC-Level, 1964-80
1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1978 1980
SITC SBCTOR Bowen Trad. Clas.
Index Index fic.
BI TI C BI TI C BI TI C BI TI C BI TI C BI TI C BI TI C
512.1 Hydrocarbons -0.97 -100 CD -0.85 -100 CD -0.86 -100 CD -0.52 -100 CD -0.41 -99 CD -0.15 -92 CD 0.00 -77 ?
512.2 Alcohols -0.47 -8 CD -0.51 25 ? -0.54 -19 CD -0.32 -2 CD -0.27 -35 CD -0.07 -22 CD 0.18 25 CA
512.3 Ethers .. -100 .. .. -100 .. .. -100 .. -0.49 -94 CD -0.48 -96 CD -0.49 -48 CD -0.51 -13 CD
512.4 Canpounds .. -100 .. .. -100 .. -0.59 -100 CD -0.78 -93 CD 0.44 -95 ? 0.25 -93 ? 0.65 -89 ?
512.5 Acids -0.50 -94 CD -0.50 -93 CD -0.36 -90 CD -0.57 -92 CD -0.02 -95 CD -0.08 -57 CD -0.01 -62 CD
512.7 Nitrogen -97 .. .. -98 .. 0.52 -94 ? 1.84 -96 ? 0.85 -85 ? .. -70
513.2 Chemical nes -0.02 -100 CD 0.04 -100 ? 0.44 -91 ? -0.53 -84 ? -0.24 -59 CD 0.28 -83 ? 0.38 -53 ?
513.3 Inorganic Acid -0.09 -100 CD -0.32 -100 CD 0.10 -100 ? -0.78 -100 CD -0.25 -100 CD -0.23 -99 CD -0.13 -100 CD
513.4 Ccnpounds -0.01 -100 CD 0.82 0 ? 0.75 -100 ? 0.40 -100 ? 1.26 -100 ? 2.01 -100 ? 2.08 -100 ?
513.5 Met. Oxids .. -100 .. .. -100 .. -0.16 -100 CD 1.25 -95 ? 0.70 -76 ? 0.94 -75 ? 1.55 -53 ?
513.6 Other " -0.74 -97 CD -0.48 -96 CD -0.79 -94 CD -0.59 -92 CD -0.52 -92 CD -0.28 -76 CD -0.02 -55 CD
514.2 Metal. Salts -0.49 -100 CD -0.48 -100 CD -0.43 -98 CD -0.79 -100 CD -0.43 -99 CD -0.76 -97 CD .. -96
554.1 Soaps 3.24 0 ? 3.01 -100 ? 3.32 0 ? 1.60 -38 7 2.52 42 CA 1.98 -100 ? .. 90
554.2 Surface-act.Agents -0.72 -100 CD 0.01 -100 ? 0.33 -100 ? -0.28 -100 CD 0.11 -100 ? 0.90 0 ? .. -23
561.1 Nitrog. Fert. -0.93 -100 CD -0.97 -100 CD -0.98 -100 CD -0.81 -100 CD -0.74 -100 CD -0.74 100 ? -0.69 -100 CD
561.2 Phosph. Fert. -0.43 -100 CD -0.51 -100 CD -0.38 -100 CD -0.08 -96 CD 1.01 -100 ? 0.81 -95 ? .. -98
581.2 Prod. Polymer. 0.51 -100 ? -0.37 -100 CD -0.47 -100 CD -0.18 -90 CD 0.07 -94 ? 0.12 -89 ? 0.27 -50 ?
599.2 Insecticides 1.22 -100 ? 2.24 -100 ? 5.79 0 ? -0.37 -92 CD -0.63 -90 CD -0.05 -85 CD 0.21 -6 ?
611.3 Calf Leather 1.21 -100 ? .. -100 .. 2.65-100 ? .. -100 .. 3.02 95 CA 3.40 98 CA
629.1 Rubber Tyres .. 92 .. .. 33 .. .. 45 .. 0.67 19 CA 1.16 39 CA 1.10 69 CA 0.58 57 CA
631.1 Venner Sheets .. 100 .. .. 100 .. .. 100 .. 1.84 98 CA 1.20 .88 CA 1.28 58 CA 1.10 45 CA



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































711.5 Engine 1.39 -89
712.1 Ag.M-Prep. 6.14 -5
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1973 1976 1978 1980
BI TI C BI TI C BI TI C BI TI
22
-0.97 -100 CD
? 0.45 -31 ?
CD -0.55 -99 CD
CD -0.61 6 ?
? 0.80 81 CA
CA -0.22 99 ?
-0.36 -100 CD
-100
-73 .. 0.89 -73 ? 1.87 -88 ? -97 0°





1 s index (BI) is equal to: 0 = comparative advantage is undetermined, BI < 0 = comparative disadvantage and BI > 0 = comparative advantage. In the case of
traditional index: TI > 0 = comparative advantage, TI < 0 = comparative disvadvantage. TI is based on Brazilian imports from and exports to the world.
.. Information not available.
? must be interpreted as a conflict between both indices in classifying a sector with or without comparative advantage.


























































































































?Table A 9 - Brazil - A Ccmparison of the Traditional Concept of Revealed Comparative Advantage and Bowen's Index















































































































































































































































In 1976, for example, the Bowen index indicates comparative advantage for 49 Brazilian industries, whereas 26
sectors had a comparative advantage according to the RCA-concept (in case of trade with the world); 22 sectors
out of these 26 sectors are also classified as sectors having a comparative advantage according to Bowen, i.e. a
coincidence of 85 percent between both indices. - The disaggregation was done at the 4-digit SITC-level. Fig-
ures in parentheses beneath Bowen's index represent exports of those sectors as a percentage of total manufac-
tured exports. -
 cFirst figure in parentheses represent the number of sectors which coincide between both in-
dices, the second figure indicates the degree of coincidence in percent.
Source; Own calculations based on UN, Conrnodity Trade Statistics.- 100 -
Table A10 - Value Added per Bnployee in Industries in Brazil and Various Country
Groups , 1980 (thousands of US$)
Developed Middle in- High in-
Brazil market come de- come de- ALADI











































































































Total industries 13.8 23.3 9.0 12.9 13.7
aünweighted averages for all countries included in a specific country group. Country
groups defined as in the source. - In several cases, data is for 1979 or 1981. -
ünweighted averages for all industries listed.
Source: UNIDO, Handbook of Industrial Statistics 1984. - Own calculations.- 101 -
Table All - Wages per Employee in Industries in Brazil and Various Country Groups
a,
1980 (thousands of US$)
Developed Middle in- High in-
Brazil market come de- cane de- ALADI




































































































Total industries 2.8 12.0 2.9 5.1 4.1
^Jnweighted averages for all countries included in a specific country group. Country
groups defined as in the source. - In several cases, data is for 1979 or 1981. -
A differentiation of value added per,employee into wage and non-wage components is
not available for rubber products. - 'TJnweighted averages for all industries listed.
Source: UNIDO, Handbook of Industrial Statistics 1984. - Own calculations.- 102 -
Table A12 - Non-Wage Value Added per Eitployee in Industries in Brazil and Various
Country Groups , 1980 (thousands of US$)
ISICT
Developed Middle in- High in-





































































































Total industries 10.7 11.0 5.8 7.6 9.2
unweighted averages for all countries included in a specific country group. Country
groups defined as in the source. - In several cases, data is for 1979 or 1981. -
-
 CA differentiation of value added per employee into wage and non-wage components is
not available for rubber products. - unweighted averages for all industries listed.
Source; UNIDO, Handbook of Industrial Statistics 1984. - Own calculations.- 103 -
Table A13 - Spearman and Pearson Coefficients for Correlations between Factor Intensities
in Brazilian Industries and Brazil's Export Pattern
























































































































































Correlations are run between factor intensities as reported in Table 2.2 and export
shares of the respective industries in total Brazilian manufactured exports to various
markets as reported in Table A6. "A" denotes the change in export shares in percentage
points. Pearson coefficients are given only if correlation results differ between both
procedures, i.e. Spearman rank correlations being statistically significant and Pearson
correlations remaining insignificant, and vice versa. - ** significant at the 5 percent
level; - *10 percent level. - In parentheses: change in export shares in percent.
Source: Tables 2.2 and A6. - Own calculations.Table A14 - Evolution of Revealed Coinparative (Dis)Mvantage of Brazilian Manufactured Exports Classified by Export






































































































































































































Nunibers in parentheses represent total exports of those sectors as a percentage of total manufactured exports to the
region.
Source: Table A7.- 105 -














































































































































































n.a. = not available.
Source; Tyler (1976, Table VTI-10, p. 239); Vforld Bank (1983).- 106 -
Table AI6 - The Relationship between Policy Incentives and Factor
Intensities in Brazilian Industries: Rank Correlation
Results, 1980
. Value added
Incentive rates per employee




incentives 0.18 (0.29) 0.04 (0.45) 0.25 (0.23)
Financial export
incentives -0.54 (0.04) -0.30 (0.19) -0.48 (0.07)
Total export





protection -0.28 (0.19) 0.02 (0.47) -0.24 (0.24)
-0.27 (0.20) 0.14 (0.34) -0.27 (0.21)
Adjusted effective
incentives to
domestic sales -0.33 (0.15) 0.13 (0.35) -0.32 (0.17)
In parentheses: level of significance of Spearman correlation
coefficients; number of observations: 12 in case of value added
per employee, 11 in case of wages and non-wage value added per
employee.
For the definition of incentive rates, see Table 2.5.
Source: Tables 2.2 and 2.5. - Own calculations.- 107 -


















































































































































aThe export and import data was translated to Cruzeiros according to the following exchange rates, as
published by the IMF, International Financial Statistics (item rf): 0.521 Cr. per ÜS$ in 1963, 2.669
in 1967, 6.126 in 1973, and 52.71 in 1980. X Stands for exports, M for imports, and Q for production.
The relationship between SITC-categories and the Brazilian classification was taken fron Silber (1983,
Table 25, p. 134).
Source: CKm calculations based on IBGE, Anuario Estatistico do Brasil; UN, Connodity Trade Statistics.- 108 -
Table A18 - Relative Importance of Different Types of Firms in











Wood and wood products











































































Total 20.7 24.0 55.3
Classification according to total sales (faturamento)
Source; Doellinger, Cavalvanti (1975, Table III. 8, p. 39)- 109 -
Table A19 - Participation of Foreign-Owned Firms in Total Employment,
Value Added, Domestic Sales, Exports and Export Subsidies
in Brazil, 1978 (percent)
Export subsidies
Income
Employ- Value Domestic Export Export tax
ment added sales sales credit exemption
Total manufacturing 26.1 35.9 33.0 38.8 47.5 33.5
Non-metallic minerals


















































































































































Defined as firms in which non-residents controlled more than 10 percent
of equity. Thus, 841 out of 12 435 sample firms were labelled foreign-
owned firms.
Source: ECLA (1985, p. 21, Table 2).- 110 -
Table A20 - Logit Anal^sis of the Probability of Exporting in Brazilian
Industries
Non-metallic minerals














































































































































































































































In parentheses: asymptotic Standard errors; ** indicates significance at
the 1 percent level; * 5 percent level. - S: firm size, measured by the
natural logarithm of value of sales; K: capital intensity defined as value
added per employee; ADV: ratio of advertising expenditures to domestic
sales; LICFOR: dummy variable which is equal to one in case of foreign
participation in the form of direct investment or licensing agreement, and
zero otherwise.
Source: ECLA (1985, p. 36, Table 12).- 111 -
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